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I. INTRODUCTION
A broken arm, face lacerations, minor brain damage, and paralysis below
the waist.  These are the injuries nineteen-year-old Jessica Brookes suffered 
when Joseph Stevens, a state worker driving a state-owned vehicle, 
slammed into Ms. Brookes’ vehicle on the highway.1 This was Mr. Stevens’s
second car accident in the course and scope of his employment.2  Due to
the injuries caused by Mr. Stevens’s alleged negligence, Ms. Brookes 
1. While Ms. Brookes’ story is fictional, this type of situation commonly occurs 
where plaintiffs’ suits are barred because they failed to present their government claims to 
the appropriate recipient designated under section 915 of the California Government Code. 
See, e.g., Jefferson v. City of Fremont, No. C-12-0926 EMC, 2013 WL 1747917, at *10 
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2013) (dismissing plaintiff’s state law claim for failing to present his
claim to the proper recipient under section 915); DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa 
Clara, 289 P.3d 884, 889 (Cal. 2012) (barring plaintiff’s claim for failing to present her
claim to the designated recipient under section 915 of the California Government Code); 
Westcon Const. Corp. v. County of Sacramento, 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 89, 103–04 (Ct. App. 
2007) (barring plaintiff’s claim for failing to serve it on the proper recipient under section
915).
2. “An employee acts within ‘the scope of his employment’ when he is engaged
in work he was employed to perform or when an act is incident to his duty and was 
performed for the benefit of his employer and not to serve his own purpose.”  Fowler v.
Howell, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 484, 487 (Ct. App. 1996) (citing Mazzola v. Feinstein, 201 Cal. 
Rptr. 148, 152–53 (Ct. App. 1984)). 
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filed a claim within the six-month statute of limitations with the California 
public entity that employed Mr. Stevens.3 
Like many claimants, Ms. Brookes failed to realize that the California 
Government Claims Act required her to present her claim with the Victim
Compensation and Government Claims Board (VCGCB), and not with the
California public entity directly.4 When Ms. Brookes did not receive any 
response from the public entity, she filed her lawsuit in state court within 
the statute of limitations.5  The defendant public entity eventually filed a
motion for summary judgment, alleging that Ms. Brookes failed to comply
with the claim presentation requirements of the Government Claims Act (the
Act).6  Meanwhile, the period to file a late claim or to seek relief from the 
court’s claim presentation requirements had expired.7  The court granted the
defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the basis that the plaintiff 
3. A “‘[p]ublic entity’ includes the state, the Regents of the University of California,
the Trustees of the California State University and the California State University, a county, 
city, district, public authority, public agency, and any other political subdivision or public
corporation in the State.”  CAL. GOV’T CODE § 811.2 (West 2012).  Section 945 of the 
California Government Code provides that “[a] public entity may sue and be sued.”  CAL.
GOV’T CODE § 945 (West 2012).
4. In this hypothetical, section 915, subdivision (b) of the California Government
Code was triggered because Ms. Brookes attempted to sue the state of California since Mr. 
Stevens, an employee of a California state department, was acting within the scope of his
employment at the time the act resulting in injury to Ms. Brookes occurred.  Under the
Government Claims Act, state and local public entities may be held “liable for injury
proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the
scope of his employment . . . .” See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 815.2 (West 2012). Since Ms. 
Brookes attempted to sue the state, she was required to present her claim to the Victim 
Compensation and Government Claims Board before filing suit in state court. See CAL.
GOV’T CODE § 915(b) (West 2012). See infra Part II.C, for a further discussion of the 
Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board and its role in administering
government claims against the state.  “‘State’ means the State and any office, officer, department, 
division, bureau, board, commission or agency of the State claims against which are paid 
by warrants drawn by the Controller.”  CAL. GOV’T CODE § 940.6 (West 2012).
5. “Statute of limitations” refers to “a statute establishing a time limit for suing in
a civil case, based on the date when the claim accrued (as when the injury occurred or was
discovered).”  Statute of Limitations, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
6. These claim presentation requirements are codified in sections 900–935.7 of the 
California Government Code. See generally CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 900–935.7 (West 2012). 
7. When a claim against the state is not properly presented within the designated 
statute of limitations period, claimants may apply to the VCGCB to file a late claim. See 
GOV’T § 911.4(a).  The application to present a late claim against the state must be 
presented to the public entity, the VCGCB, “within a reasonable time not to exceed one 
year after the accrual of the cause of action . . . .”  CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 911.4(b), 915(b)
(West 2012). See infra Part II.D, for a further discussion of presenting a late claim. 
 703
LEWIS (DO NOT DELETE) 10/22/2018 12:38 PM      
 
 
    






       
  









     
     
 
    













     
presented the claim to the incorrect recipient.  Ms. Brookes was subsequently 
left with outrageous medical bills and emotional suffering for which she had
no way to legally recover.
Ms. Brookes went from being a victim of a public entity’s negligence 
to a victim of the legal system, all because of a minor procedural misstep.8 
In the process, the legal system’s purpose—the search for truth and
justice—was lost.9  Ms. Brookes was afforded no closure, no day in court,
and the scales of justice tipped heavily against fairness.10  This story about
Ms. Brookes represents the struggle that many individuals endure when 
trying to file a suit against a state entity that has injured them.
Although the Act’s purported goal is to eliminate uncertainty in the claim 
presentation requirements, uncertainty remains—as evidenced by plaintiffs’
and plaintiffs’ attorneys’ failure to comply with the strict procedural 
and hyper-technical requirements of the claim presentation sections of the 
Act.11  The Act mandates compliance with various claim presentation 
requirements for claimants wishing to sue the state of California.12 The
legislative objective of these statutes is to provide the state entity with
notice of the claim so it can potentially reduce unnecessary litigation and 
prevent future harm.13  California Government Code section 915, subdivision 
8. See A. Benjamin Spencer, The Restrictive Ethos in Civil Procedure, 78 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 353 (2010), for a discussion of how strict procedural rules are inconsistent 
with the goals of the American judicial system in the context of federal civil procedure.
9. See id. at 353 (“The courts are established to administer justice, and you cannot 
have justice if justice is constantly being thwarted and turned aside or delayed by a 
labyrinth of technical entanglements.” (citing Rules of Civil Procedure for the District
Courts of the United States: Hearing on H.R. 8892 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
75th Cong. 2 (1938) (statement of Homer Cummings, Att’y Gen. of the United States))). 
10. When depicted, the “scales of justice” are generally held by a woman in her left 
hand and are held evenly to “imply a just balance.”  See Michael E. Gehringer, Questions 
and Answers, 73 LAW LIBR. J. 740, 744 (1980); see also Symbols of Law, SUPREME COURT 
OF THE UNITED STATES (May 23, 2002), https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/symbolso
flaw.pdf [https://perma.cc/839U-KSD8] (explaining that the scales of justice symbolize 
“the impartial deliberation, or ‘weighing,’ of two sides in a legal dispute . . . .”).
11. See DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa Clara, 289 P.3d 884, 888 (Cal. 2012)
(“A goal of the Government Claims Act is to eliminate confusion and uncertainty resulting 
from different claims procedures.” (citing Recommendation Relating to Sovereign Immunity, 
Claims, Actions and Judgments Against Public Entities and Public Employees, 4 CAL. L.
REVISION COMM’N REP. 1008 (1963), http://www.clrc.ca.gov/pub/Printed-Reports/Pub044.pdf
[https://perma.cc/66VT-6F26])).
12. See generally GOV’T §§ 900–935.7 (providing various claim presentation requirements 
plaintiffs must comply with to bring suit against the state of California). 
13. See Recommendation Relating to Sovereign Immunity, supra note 11, at 1007, 
1008 (“Claims statutes have two principal purposes. First, they give the governmental 
entity an opportunity to settle just claims before suit is brought.  Second, they permit the 
entity to make an early investigation of the facts on which a claim is based, thus enabling 
it to defend itself against unjust claims and to correct the conditions or practices which
gave rise to the claim.” (citing Recommendation and Study Relating to the Presentation of
704
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(b), requires potential plaintiffs to file their government claims with the 
VCGCB as a prerequisite for filing a lawsuit against the state or its 
employees in a tort or contracts matter.14  Under current case law, if a potential
plaintiff submits a claim directly to the public entity instead of the VCGCB, 
that plaintiff may be barred from filing the lawsuit.15 
As a result, there is a strong temptation for defense attorneys to rely on
this technicality to get cases dismissed at an early stage by failing to notify 
the plaintiff that their claim was not properly presented.16  This is an unfair
windfall in the system given that the central purpose of the claim presentation 
statutes under the Act is to provide notice to the public entity.17  When potential 
plaintiffs submit their claims directly to the entity instead of complying 
with the statute, the entity has in fact received notice of the claim.  This 
technicality deprives potential plaintiffs, who may have meritorious claims,
of their day in court.18 
To recalibrate the scales of justice, this Comment advocates for a statutory 
amendment that encompasses two changes.  First, the amendment would 
require plaintiffs to present their government claims against the state directly
Claims Against Public Entities, 2 CAL. L. REVISION COMM’N REP. A-1, A-1, A-7 (1959), 
http://www.clrc.ca.gov/pub/Printed-Reports/Pub019.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YPE-DQBU])). 
14. See infra Part II.B, for the exact language of section 915, subdivision (b) of the 
California Government Code. 
15. See, e.g., DiCampli-Mintz, 289 P.3d at 888–92 (finding that plaintiff did not 
satisfy the Government Claims Act because she failed to present her malpractice claim to 
the statutorily designated recipient pursuant to section 915); Judicial Council v. Superior
Court (Bean), 177 Cal. Rptr. 3d 602, 615 (Ct. App. 2014); Life v. County of Los Angeles, 
278 Cal. Rptr. 196, 199–200 (Ct. App. 1991) (finding that plaintiff failed to comply with
section 915 when he presented his malpractice claim to the medical center’s legal
department, instead of the statutorily designated recipient). 
16. See, e.g., DiCampli-Mintz, 289 P.3d at 887 (involving County defense attorney
who did not notify plaintiff of her misdirected claim, and filed a motion for summary
judgment to have plaintiff’s case dismissed). 
17. See, e.g., City of Stockton v. Superior Court, 171 P.3d 20, 25 (Cal. 2007)
(stating the purpose of the claim presentation statutes is “to provide the public entity [with]
sufficient information to enable it to adequately investigate claims and to settle them, if
appropriate, without the expense of litigation” (quoting City of San Jose v. Superior Court,
525 P.2d 701, 706 (Cal. 1974))); see also Connelly v. County of Fresno, 52 Cal. Rptr. 3d
720, 726 (Ct. App. 2006) (stating the purpose of the claims statute is “to give the public
entity timely notice of the nature of the claim so that it may investigate and settle those
having merit without litigation” (quoting Santee v. Santa Clara Cty. Office of Educ., 269
Cal. Rptr. 605, 611 (Ct. App. 1990))). 
18. “Day in court” is “[t]he right and opportunity, in a judicial tribunal, to litigate a 
claim, seek relief, or defend one’s rights.”  Day in Court, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th
ed. 2014). 
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to the public entity that allegedly caused the harm, instead of the VCGCB,
thereby accomplishing the statute’s objective of providing notice to the state
entity.  Second, instead of the VCGCB assessing claims against the state,
each state agency would have its own government claims office (GCO)
handle government claims for the respective individualized entity.  This
would promote efficiency in the government claims process by cutting out 
the “middleman,” the VCGCB.  Moreover, this amendment would ensure
that plaintiffs avoid a fatal loss of substantive rights due to a minor
procedural technicality, one that does not achieve the statute’s legislative 
purpose of providing state entities with notice of potential lawsuits. 
Part II of this Comment provides a brief history of the Act, an overview 
of the current process for filing government claims against the state of
California, including the VCGCB’s role in that process, and the consequences
for failing to comply with the claim presentation statutes, specifically
focusing on Government Code section 915, subdivision (b).  Part III discusses
the legislative intent underlying section 915’s claim presentation requirements 
and examines how the requirements are inconsistent with the statute’s 
purpose. Part IV discusses California courts’ varying interpretations and
applications of the strict claim presentation requirement under section
915, subdivision (b), specifically focusing on two California decisions: 
Jamison v. State of California (Jamison) and DiCampli-Mintz v. County
of Santa Clara (DiCampli-Mintz). Part IV also discusses the doctrine of 
substantial compliance and analyzes how these two California decisions vary 
in their applications of the doctrine.  Part V explains the need to reconcile 
the Jamison and DiCampli-Mintz decisions.  Part VI discusses potential ways
to reconcile these cases, and provides the statutory language and benefits of
the superior solution.  Finally, Part VII concludes by summarizing the
consequences of California’s current Government Code section 915, while
highlighting the beneficial impact the proposed statutory amendment would
have on the legal system. 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE GOVERNMENT CLAIMS ACT
A. History & Function of the Act
On September 20, 1963, the California legislature enacted the Tort Claims 
Act.19  Because the Act extends beyond tort claims, the name has since
been changed to the Government Claims Act.20 Before 1963, government 
19. See Tubbs v. S. Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 433 P.2d 169, 171 (Cal. 1967). 
20. In 2007, the California Supreme Court dropped the title of Tort Claims Act and
began referring to the claims statutes as the Government Claims Act. See City of Stockton, 
171 P.3d at 27–28 (finding that the “Government Claims Act” is a more appropriate title 
than the “Tort Claims Act” since the statutory requirements apply not only to tort claims, 
706
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entities were generally immune from tort liability.21  In 1959, the California
Law Revision Commission (the Commission) reported inconsistencies
with claim presentation requirements for public entities throughout the 
state.22  In response to these findings, the Commission stressed the necessity 
of specific and uniform procedures for bringing claims against public entities
to avoid confusion.23 In 1961, the California Supreme Court abolished the
common law rule of governmental immunity from tort liability, thereby
permitting plaintiffs to sue the state for tortious acts.24  In response to this
decision, the Commission engaged in a comprehensive study on governmental
tort liabilities and immunities.25 
In 1963, the Commission presented its inclusive report and recommendation 
to the California legislature.26  With the Commission’s aid, the 1963 
California legislature enacted the Government Claims Act, which applies 
to all public entities and their employees.27  The Act provides a comprehensive
statutory scheme laying out the law of governmental liability and immunity
in California.28  Under the Act, “a public entity is not liable for an injury
whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or
a public employee,” unless otherwise provided by statute.29  Essentially, 
but also to breach of contract claims).  This name change was later codified in the California
Government Code. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 810(b) (West 2012).
21. See, e.g., Talley v. N. San Diego Cty. Hosp. Dist., 257 P.2d 22, 27 (Cal. 1953)
(finding that the doctrine of sovereign immunity applies to government entities and that 
counties are not liable for negligence of their employees), overruled by Muskopf v.
Corning Hosp. Dist., 359 P.2d 457 (Cal. 1961). 
22. See DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa Clara, 289 P.3d 884, 889 (Cal. 2012). 
23. See Recommendation and Study Relating to The Presentation of Claims Against 
Public Entities, supra note 13, at A-40, A-57 to A-62, A-122. 
24. See Muskopf, 359 P.2d at 458 (concluding that “the rule of governmental 
immunity from tort liability . . . must be discarded as mistaken and unjust”). In that same
year, the California Supreme Court also decided Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary School 
District, 359 P.2d 465 (Cal. 1961). “The combined effect of Muskopf and Lipman rendered
public entities generally liable for torts, including those resulting from the discretionary
acts and omissions of their employees.” CAL. GOV’T TORT LIABILITY PRAC. § 1.39 (C.E.B. 
4th ed. 2013). 
25. See Recommendation Relating to Sovereign Immunity, supra note 11, at 803. 
26. See id. 
27. This legislation is codified in sections 810–996.6 of the California Government 
Code. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 810–996.6 (West 2012). See supra note 3, for the definition 
of “public entity.”  “‘Public employee’ means an employee of a public entity.”  GOV’T § 811.4. 
28. See CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 810–996.6 (West 2012). 
29. GOV’T § 815(a).  Under the Act, state and local public entities may be held
“liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public 
entity within the scope of his employment.” GOV’T § 815.2(a).  Public entities may also
 707









   
   
 
   
 
 
   






















the Act eliminated all common law or judicially devised forms of
governmental liability, and made it wholly statutory, except as provided 
by the state and federal constitutions.30  A public entity’s liability is also subject 
to a variety of statutory immunities within the Act.31 
B. Process for Filing Government Claims Against the State
The Government Claims Act provides the process for filing claims against 
various types of entities, and the applicable requirements with which claimants 
must comply will vary depending on which entity the claimant is filing 
against.32  This Comment, however, centers only on government claims against 
the state of California.33  Government Code section 905.2 describes the kinds
be liable under the Act for intentional torts of their elected officials when both the elected 
official and the public entity are co-defendants in the same action. See GOV’T § 815.3(a). 
Additionally, public entities may be “liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition of
its property.” GOV’T § 835.
30. See GOV’T § 815 note (Legislative Committee Comments) (“In the absence of
a constitutional requirement, public entities may be held liable only if a statute . . . is found
declaring them to be liable.”).
31. See  GOV’T § 815(b) (“The liability of a public entity established by this part
(commencing with Section 814) is subject to any immunity of the public entity provided 
by statute, including this part, and is subject to any defenses that would be available to the 
public entity if it were a private person.”).  An immunity provision will generally prevail 
over the liability sections unless a statute indicates otherwise. See  GOV’T § 815, note 
(Legislative Committee Comments) (“[T]he immunity provisions will as a general rule 
prevail over all sections imposing liability.”).  “Immunity” means “[a]ny exemption from 
a duty, liability, or service of process.”  Immunity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 
2014).  Some of the immunities in the California Government Code include the prisoner
immunity for negligence, the natural conditions immunity, and the hazardous recreational 
activities immunity. See GOV’T §§ 844.6, 831.2, 831.7. 
32. See GOV’T § 915(a) (claim presentation requirements for claims against local 
public entities); GOV’T § 915(b) (claim presentation requirements for claims against the 
state); GOV’T § 915(c) (claim presentation requirements for claims against judicial branch 
entities); GOV’T § 915(d) (claim presentation requirements for claims against a California
State University); GOV’T § 940.4 (“‘Local public entity’ includes a county, city, district, 
public authority, public agency, and any other political subdivision or public corporation
in the State, but does not include the State.”); GOV’T § 940.3 (“A ‘judicial branch entity’
is a public entity and means any superior court, court of appeals, the Supreme Court, the 
Judicial Council, or the Administrative Office of the Courts.”). 
33. See supra note 4, for a description of who classifies as the “state.”  Although 
this Comment centers on government claims against the state and plaintiffs’ failure to 
present these claims to the statutorily designated recipient, section 915 of the Government 
Code also designates specific recipients for claims against local government and judicial 
branch entities. See GOV’T § 915(a), (c).  Hence, the issue of plaintiffs failing to present 
their claims to the correct recipient appear in these contexts as well. See, e.g., DiCampli-
Mintz v. County of Santa Clara, 289 P.3d 884, 889 (Cal. 2012) (holding that plaintiff­
patient’s claim against the county was barred because she presented it to the risk
management department of the county hospital instead of the county “clerk, secretary or 
auditor” as required by section 915); Judicial Council v. Superior Court, 177 Cal. Rptr. 3d
602, 615 (Ct. App. 2014) (holding that plaintiff failed to comply with the claim
708
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of claims against the state, which require a claimant to present a formal
written claim.34  The “general rule is that ‘all claims’ for ‘money or damages
against the state . . . for an injury for which the state is liable’ are subject to 
the Act, unless exempted by statute.”35 
A crucial aspect of the Act is complying with certain claim presentation 
requirements, which is a prerequisite to maintaining a suit against the state.36 
Potential plaintiffs must comply with these requirements to sue the state
or its employees for “money or damages” in a tort or breach of contract
action.37  Accordingly, potential plaintiffs must read these sections carefully
and comply with all of their requirements or risk their claims becoming 
barred.38 
One requirement is that claimants present their government claims to a 
specific recipient before filing suit.39  Under section 915, subdivision (b), the
VCGCB is the appropriate recipient for government claims against the State
of California.40  This section reads as follows:
presentation requirement of the Government Claims Act by presenting her claim against a 
judicial branch entity to the VCGCB instead of the secretariat, the designated recipient 
under section 915(c)(4)). 
34. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 905.2 (West 2012).
35. CAL. GOV’T TORT LIABILITY PRAC. § 5.21 (C.E.B. 4th ed. 2013) (citing CAL.
GOV’T CODE § 905.1 (West 2012)). 
36. See sources cited supra note 6; see also Nguyen v. L.A. Cty. Harbor/UCLA 
Med. Ctr., 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 709, 711 (Ct. App. 1992).  Note that there are some exceptions, 
such as claims against the Regents of the University of California. See CAL. GOV’T CODE
§ 905.6 note (Law Revision Commission Comments) (West 2012) (explaining that 
“neither the State nor the local public entity claims presentation procedures apply to claims
against the University of California” (citing 4 CAL. L. REVISION COMM’N REP. 1001 
(1963))).  However, a claim must fall within an exemption, such as the University of 
California Regents exemption, otherwise a plaintiff’s failure to submit the claim in accordance
with the claim presentation requirements will preclude suit against the public entity.  CAL.
GOV’T TORT LIABILITY PRAC. § 5.42 (C.E.B. 4th ed. 2013). 
37. See GOV’T § 905.2. 
38. Many suits are disqualified at an early stage through motions to dismiss or motions
for summary judgment. See, e.g., DiCampli-Mintz, 289 P.3d at 887, 888–89 (involving a 
defense attorney who filed a motion for summary judgement after plaintiff presented her 
claim to the improper recipient). Law firms recognize the challenges these hyper-technical
claim presentation requirements pose and warn potential plaintiffs accordingly. See, e.g.,
Government Claims in California, HIDALGO L. FIRM, http://www.hidalgolawfirm.com/ 
[https://perma.cc/4CVX-SCBB] (follow “Rights & Responsibilities” hyperlink; then follow
“Government Claims” hyperlink) (last visited Aug. 1, 2016) (“BEWARE: Government Claim
laws of California . . . are highly technical laws, with requirements and exceptions that are not 
readily evident.”).
39. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 915 (West 2012).
40. Id. § 915(b). 
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(b) Except as provided in subdivisions (c)41 and (d),42 a claim, any amendment
thereto, or an application for leave to file a late claim shall be presented to the 
state by either of the following means:
(1) 	 Delivering it to an office of the Victim Compensation and Government 
 Claims Board. 
(2) 	 Mailing it to the Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board 
at its principal office.43 
The other pertinent subdivision is section 915, subdivision €.44  This
subdivision explains that even if the claim is not mailed or personally
delivered to the VCGCB, as required by subdivision (b), the claim is sufficient 
so long as the VCGCB actually receives it.45 
C. The Role of the VCGCB
The VCGCB, established in 1911 and formerly known as the Board of
Control, administers the Government Claims Act on behalf of the State of 
California through the Government Claims Program (the GCP), and thus 
plays a crucial role in the government claims process.46  The VCGCB has
41. Section 915, subdivision (c), of the California Government Code provides different 
presentation requirements for claims against a judicial branch entity. See GOV’T § 915(c).
If a potential plaintiff wishes to sue a superior court or one of its judges, a court executive 
officer, or a trial court employee, the plaintiff must first present the claim to the court 
executive officer. GOV’T § 915(c)(1).  If a potential plaintiff wishes to sue a court of appeals or
one of its judges, the plaintiff must present the claim to the clerk or administrator of the 
court of appeals.  GOV’T § 915(c)(2).  If a potential plaintiff wishes to sue the Supreme 
Court or one of its judges, the claim must first be presented to the clerk of the Supreme 
Court. GOV’T § 915(c)(3).  If a potential plaintiff wishes to sue the Judicial Council or the 
Administrative Office of the Courts, the claim must first be presented with the Secretariat
of the Judicial Council. GOV’T § 915(c)(4).
42. Section 915, subdivision (d), of the California Government Code provides different
presentation requirements for claims against California State Universities. GOV’T § 915(d). If
a potential plaintiff wishes to sue a California State University, the claim must first be
“presented to the Trustees of the California State University by delivering or mailing it to 
the Office of Risk Management at the Office of the Chancellor of the California State
University.” Id.
 43. GOV’T § 915(b).
44. See infra Part VI.A.
 45. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 915(e) (West 2012). 
46. About the Board, CAL. VICTIM COMPENSATION & GOV’T CLAIMS BD., 
http://www.vcgcb.ca.gov/board/ [https://perma.cc/C7V4-EYEN] (last visited Aug. 1, 2016); 
see also Annual Report 2013–2014, CAL. VICTIM COMPENSATION & GOV’T CLAIMS BD. 15, 
http://www.vcgcb.ca.gov/docs/reports/AnnualReport-FY-13-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/XZ2F­
RZP6] [hereinafter 2013–2014 Ann. Rep.]. The GCP, created in 1965, was the nation’s first 
Victim Compensation Program. About the Government Claims Program, CAL. VICTIM 
COMPENSATION & GOV’T CLAIMS BD., http://www.vcgcb.ca.gov/claims/about.aspx
[https://perma.cc/UVX5-GKWZ] (last visited Aug. 1, 2016). The VCGCB became responsible 
for the program in 1967.  Id.  Each year, the VCGCB receives thousands of claims against 
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many other functions aside from administering the Government Claims
Act, such as administering the Victim Compensation Program and Revenue 
Recovery Program, the California State Employees Charitable Campaign,
the Good Samaritan Act, and the Missing Children Reward Program.47  In
addition, it handles matters such as bid protests and claims of erroneously
convicted felons.48 
If an individual wishes to sue the state, the Act requires that the individual,
or someone acting on their behalf, deliver the claim to the VCGCB or mail 
it to an office of the VCGCB before filing suit in court.49 Persons wishing
to sue the state must also pay a twenty-five dollar filing fee upon submitting 
their claim to the VCGCB.50  Individuals must file claims against the state 
for death or injury to a person, or damage of personal property, within six
the state of California. See 2013–2014 Ann. Rep., supra, at 16 (stating that 7033 government 
claims were received in fiscal year 2013–2014). 
47. Although it has many other functions, the VCGCB’s duties were expanded with
the enactment of the Government Claims Act.  About the Board, supra note 46. Prior to 
the enactment of the Government Claims Act, the VCGCB “duties included the adoptions 
of rules and regulations governing the presentation and audit of contract or tort claims.” 
Id.  Since 1963, the VCGCB has been responsible for administering the Act on behalf of 
the state. Id.
 48. Id.
 49. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 915(b) (West 2012). The claim shall include: “the 
name and post office address of the claimant,” “[t]he post office address to which the person
presenting the claim desires notices to be sent,” “[t]he date, place and other circumstances
of the occurrence or transaction which gave rise to the claim asserted,” “[a] general
description of the indebtedness, obligation, injury, damage or loss incurred so far as it may
be known at the time of presentation of the claim,” “[t]he name or names of the public
employee or employees causing the injury, damage, or loss, if known,” “[t]he amount claimed
if it totals less than ten thousand dollars ($10,000) as of the date of presentation of the 
claim . . . [but] [i]f the amount claimed exceeds ten thousand dollars ($10,000), no dollar
amount shall be included in the claim.” CAL. GOV’T CODE § 910 (West 2012).  Additionally, 
the claimant or someone acting on his or her behalf must sign the claim. CAL. GOV’T CODE
§ 910.2 (West 2012). 
50. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 905.2(c) (West 2012). Note that certain persons with
financial difficulties are exempt from paying this filing fee. See GOV’T § 905.2(c)(1)(A)– 
(C).  For example, the fee shall not apply to persons whose monthly income is 125 percent 
or less of the current monthly poverty line, persons who are receiving benefits pursuant to
the Supplemental Security Income and State Supplemental Payments programs, the 
California Work Opportunity and Responsibility to Kids Act program, or the Food Stamp 
program, or inmates who have a balance of $100 or less credited to their trust accounts 
ninety days prior to the date the claim is filed. See id.; see also Government Claims Filing 
Fee and Fee Waiver, CAL. VICTIM COMPENSATION & GOV’T CLAIMS BD., http://www.vcgcb.
ca.gov/claims/fee.aspx [https://perma.cc/B5GL-M9VP] (last visited Aug. 1, 2016). 
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months of the incident that gave rise to the claim.51  Individuals filing claims
against the state for all other injuries must do so within one year of the incident 
that gave rise to the claim.52  Generally, a claim is considered presented
with the VCGCB on the date that the claimant submits the claim, either
personally or by mail, and pays the mandatory twenty-five dollar filing fee.53 
Claimants may not pursue their claims in court until the VCGCB has
rejected or denied their claim.54  When a claimant delivers a claim to the
VCGCB, the VCGCB “shall grant or deny the application within forty-
five days after it is presented.”55  During this forty-five day period, the GCP
staff reviews the claim for “sufficiency, jurisdiction, and timeliness.”56 When 
assessing a claim against the state, the GCP staff contacts the public entity,
notifies it of the claim, and works with that affected public entity to resolve 
the claim.57  The GCP staff assesses possible early resolution opportunities,
provides its recommendation to the entity, and gives the entity an opportunity
to respond.58  The public entity can accept the claim, reject the claim, or 
partially accept the claim.59  If resolution is not successful, the GCP staff 
prepares a recommendation to the three-member Board regarding the
 51. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 911.2(a) (West 2012). Claims against the state for damage 
against growing crops also must be presented within this six-month time period. See id.
 52. See id.
 53. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 911.2(b)(1) (West 2012). If a claimant’s fee waiver is
granted, then the claimant’s claim is considered presented to the VCGCB on the date that
the claim was submitted with the affidavit requesting the fee waiver. See CAL. GOV’T 
CODE § 911.2(b)(2) (West 2012).  If the claimant’s fee waiver is denied, the claim is
considered presented to the VCGCB on the date the claim was submitted with the affidavit 
requesting the fee waiver so long as “the filing fee is paid to the board within [ten] calendar
days of the mailing of the notice of the denial of the fee waiver.” CAL. GOV’T CODE §
911.2(b)(3) (West 2012).
54. See Government Claims Program, CAL. VICTIM COMPENSATION & GOV’T CLAIMS
BD., http://www.vcgcb.ca.gov/claims/ [https://perma.cc/4749-L6S3] (last visited Aug. 1, 
2016) (“[A]nyone who wishes to file a lawsuit against the State or its employees for 
damages must first pursue an administrative remedy through the GCP claims process. Only
if the claim is rejected or denied may the claim be pursued through the courts.”); see also
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 945.4 (West 2012). 
55. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 911.6(a) (West 2012). However, it is possible for the
claimant and the board to extend this forty-five-day period by written agreement made
before the expiration of the period.  See id.  A claimant may amend their claim within this
forty-five-day period “or before final action thereon is taken by the board, whichever is 
later, if the claim as amended relates to the same transaction or occurrence which gave rise 
to the original claim.” See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 910.6 (West 2012).  The VCGCB shall act 
on the amended claim within forty-five days after the amended claim is presented.  CAL.
GOV’T CODE § 912.4(a) (West 2012). 
56. See How to File a Claim Against the State, CAL. VICTIM COMPENSATION & GOV’T 
CLAIMS BD., http://www.vcgcb.ca.gov/claims/howtofile.aspx [https://perma.cc/N3FD-RVHG] 
(last visited Aug. 1, 2016). 
57. Id.
 58. Id. 
59. 2013–2014 Ann. Rep., supra note 46, at 15.
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disposition of the claim, which is based on case facts and input from the 
public entity.60  Within the forty-five day period, the VCGCB notifies the
claimant and the public entity of the date of a public meeting during which 
it will take action on the claim.61  During this public meeting, the parties are
given an opportunity to comment.62 
If the VCGCB is silent during the forty-five-day period and does not 
notify the claimant of the status of their claim, the claimant’s application 
is deemed rejected.63  Once the claim is rejected, either because of the 
VCGCB’s silence or pursuant to the ruling of the public meeting, the 
claimant may file their lawsuit, but must do so within a specific timeframe.64 
If the claimant fails to do so, the suit may become barred.65 
D. Presenting a Late Claim and Seeking Court Relief from 
the Claim Requirements
If a claimant fails to present their claim against the state to the VCGCB
within the statute of limitations period, the claimant may present an 
application to file a late claim to the VCGCB.66  To file a late claim, the
claimant must generally establish that: (1) the claim was presented within 
60. Id. For more information on the three-member board, see Victim Compensation 
and Government Claims Board Members, CAL. VICTIM COMPENSATION & GOV’T CLAIMS
BD., http://www.vcgcb.ca.gov/board/members.aspx [https://perma.cc/9KAW-CWKM] (last
visited Aug. 1, 2016). 
61. See id. (“The three-member Board acts on the recommendation during a public 
meeting where those involved in the claim are given the opportunity to comment.”). 
62. Id. 
63. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 911.6(c) (West 2012) (“[I]f the board fails or refuses 
to act on an application within the time prescribed by this section, the application shall be 
deemed to have been denied on the [forty-fifth] day or, if the period within which the board 
is required to act is extended by agreement pursuant to this section, the last day of the 
period specified in the agreement.”).
64. The claimant must file suit within six months after the VCGCB has provided
notice of rejection to the claimant.  See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 945.6(a)(1) (West 2012). If
the VCGCB does not provide notice of rejection within the forty-five-day period (and is 
instead silent), the claimant may file suit within two years from the accrual of the cause of 
action. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 945.2(a)(2) (West 2012). 
65. See, e.g., Chas. L. Harney, Inc. v. State, 31 Cal. Rptr. 524, 533 (Ct. App. 1963)
(finding that plaintiff’s cause of action was barred because no action was commenced within
six months of the rejection of plaintiff’s claim). 
66. See  CAL. GOV’T CODE § 911.4(b) (West 2012) (“The application [for a late 
claim] shall be presented to the public entity . . . within a reasonable time not to exceed 
one year after the accrual of the cause of action and shall state the reason for the delay in 
presenting the claim.  The proposed claim shall be attached to the application.”). 
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one year of the date on which it accrued; (2) the claimant’s untimely claim 
resulted from “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect”; and
(3) the public entity was not prejudiced by the claimant’s failure to present
the claim timely.67  If the claimant can establish the aforementioned 
requirements, the burden then shifts to the public entity to show that it would
be prejudiced in its defense of the claim should the claimant’s application
to file a late claim be granted.68  The claimant can sue for malpractice if the
claimant’s late claim is the result of the attorney’s negligence.69 
Additionally, the Act includes notice-waiver provisions in which a 
claimant may also be excused from the claim presentation requirements
under certain circumstances.70  If a claimant’s application to present a late 
claim is denied, the claimant can ask the court to grant a petition relieving 
the claimant from the claim presentation requirements.71  If the court grants 
the claimant’s petition, then the claimant may circumvent the claim
presentation requirements and file suit.72  If the court denies claimant’s
petition, the claim will be barred unless the claimant successfully appeals 
the court’s decision to deny the petition.73
 67. See  CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 911.6(b)(1), 911.2 (West 2012).  In addition to
establishing that the claimant’s untimely claim resulted from “mistake, inadvertence, surprise,
or excusable neglect,” there are other instances where the VCGCB will grant an application to
present a late claim. See Frequently Asked Questions About Filing Government Claims,
CAL. VICTIM COMPENSATION & GOV’T CLAIMS BD., http://www.vcgcb.ca.gov/claims/faq. 
aspx [https://perma.cc/LKU9-KSMH] (last visited Aug. 1, 2016) (providing that the VCGCB 
may allow a late claim if the “[c]laimant was a minor during all of the time allotted; [the]
[i]njured claimant was physically or mentally incapacitated during all of the time allotted
and for that reason failed to file in time; or [the] [i]njured person died before the expiration
of the time allotted for filing the claim”); see also  CAL. GOV’T CODE § 911.6(b)(2)– 
(4) (West 2012). 
68. See Tammen v. San Diego County, 426 P.2d 753, 760 (Cal. 1967) (“The county
was not required to sustain its burden of proof that it would be prejudiced by a late filing
until [plaintiff] had satisfied the court that her failure was due to the causes she alleged.”). 
69. See Mitchell v. Cal. Dep’t of Transp., 210 Cal. Rptr. 266, 269 (Ct. App. 1985)
(explaining that a “client’s redress for inexcusable neglect by counsel is . . . an action for 
malpractice”).
70. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 946.6 (West 2012). 
71. See id. § 946.6(a).  The petition asking the court to relieve the claimant from
the claim presentation requirements shall be filed within six months after the claimant’s
application to present a late claim was denied or deemed to be denied by the VCGCB.  See 
GOV’T §§ 946.6(b), 911.6. 
72. See GOV’T § 946(c). 
73. See Rivera v. City of Carson, 173 Cal. Rptr. 4, 6 n.2 (Ct. App. 1981) (finding
that order denying petition for relief from claim presentation requirements was appealable). 
Although such a decision is appealable, the trial court’s decision in denying a petition for 
relief “will not be disturbed on appeal except for an abuse of discretion.”  See Ebersol v. 
Cowan, 673 P.2d 271, 276 (Cal. 1983) (citing Viles v. State, 423 P.2d 818, 821 (Cal. 1967)).
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A. Purpose of the Claim Presentation Requirements: Notice
The claim presentation statutes, including section 915, subdivision (b), 
function as notice requirements.74  The requirements serve the goal
of providing public entities with notice that someone is filing a claim or 
potential lawsuit against them.75 According to the Law Revision Commission— 
a group that played a large role in the enactment of the Act—the claim 
presentation requirements serve two purposes.  First, by providing an
opportunity to settle claims, the requirements enable public entities to bypass
expensive and burdensome litigation.76  Second, the requirements permit
the entity to investigate the facts surrounding the claim early, which, in turn,
enables the entity to defend itself against unjust claims and to remedy any 
conditions or practices that gave rise to the claim.77 
Additionally, underlying the claim presentation requirements is the 
concern for public safety. The claim presentation statutes permit public 
entities to audit their practices and inspect dangerous conditions, which, 
in turn, increases public safety.78  If the public entities are given notice,
they can avoid similar liabilities in the future by correcting deficient
conditions or practices.79  The statute’s purpose and intended goals are 
important, but only to the extent that they are actually carried out.  While 
74. See Recommendation Relating to Sovereign Immunity, supra note 11, at 1008. 
75. Id.
76. Id.; see also Phillip v. Desert Hosp. Dist., 780 P.2d 349, 353 (1989) (en banc) 
(citing City of San Jose v. Superior Court, 525 P.2d 701, 706 (Cal. 1974)).
77. See Recommendation Relating to Sovereign Immunity, supra note 11, at 1008; 
see also Crow v. State, 271 Cal. Rptr. 349, 354 (Ct. App. 1990) (“[T]he purpose . . . is to 
give the public entity the opportunity to evaluate the merit and extent of its liability and 
determine whether to grant the claim without the expenses of litigation.” (citing Donohue 
v. State, 224 Cal. Rptr. 57, 62 (Ct. App. 1986))); Gatto v. County of Sonoma, 120 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 550, 564 (Ct. App. 2002) (“The ‘purpose of the [statutory requirements for
presenting claims against the state or a local public entity] is to facilitate early investigation
of disputes and settlement without trial if appropriate, as well as to enable the public entity
to engage in fiscal planning for potential liabilities and to avoid similar liabilities in the 
future.’” (quoting Lewis C. Nelson & Sons, Inc. v. Clovis Unified Sch. Dist., 108 Cal. Rptr.
2d 715, 721 (Ct. App. 2001))).
78. See Gatto, 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 564 (citing Lewis C. Nelson & Sons, Inc., 108 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 721). 
79. See Recommendation Relating to Sovereign Immunity, supra note 11, at 1008; 
see also Lewis C. Nelson & Sons, Inc., 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 721 (citing Baines Pickwick 
Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 74, 77 (Ct. App. 1999)).
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B. The Issue: Claims Submitted to the Public Entity Should Be 

Considered Properly Presented Because the Notice 

Objective of the Statute is Achieved
 
Despite the clear language of section 915, subdivision (b), which
unambiguously states that a claim against the state must first be presented
to the VCGCB, some claimants instead file their claims with the public 
entity that allegedly caused the harm.80 Because of their noncompliance, 
these claimants are ultimately barred from filing their lawsuit against the 
state in court. 
However, if notice is at the heart of section 915, subdivision (b), it does 
not logically follow that claims become barred when individuals present
their claims to the public entity that allegedly caused the harm, thereby giving
the entity direct notice of the claim, rather than to the VCGCB, a third party.81 
If a claimant submits a claim to the responsible public entity directly, the 
public entity indeed becomes aware of the potential lawsuit.  The claimant
has fulfilled the notice goal of the claim presentation requirement because 
the public entity now has the opportunity to resolve issues without the cost 
of litigation.82  In fact, by providing direct notice of the claim to the responsible
entity, and bypassing the VCGCB, the entity is potentially afforded an 
even earlier opportunity to resolve issues. When the claimant submits a claim 
to the public entity directly, the VCGCB is cut out and the public entity
may be on notice of the claim up to forty-five days earlier because the VCGCB
has forty-five days to reject the claim upon receiving it.83 
There is no question that notice is crucial in many aspects of civil
procedure.84 There is also no question that the Legislature recognizes the
 80. See, e.g., Arista v. Mule Creek State Prison, No. C068541, 2013 WL 5410469, 
at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2013) (affirming the lower court’s decision to dismiss plaintiff’s 
suit for failing to present his claim to the VCGCB as required by the Government Claims 
Act); Lopez v. Cal. Dep’t of Ins., No. B164686, 2003 WL 21696221, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. 
July 22, 2003) (same). 
81. The Fourth District of the California Court of Appeal raised this question in 
1973. See Jamison v. State, 107 Cal. Rptr. 496, 497 (Ct. App. 1973), disapproved of by
DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa Clara, 289 P.3d 884, 892 (Cal. 2012). See infra Part 
IV.B.1, for further discussion. 
82. See Jamison, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 499 (finding that the purpose of the statute had
been satisfied since the public entity received timely notice).
83. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 911.6(a) (West 2012) (providing that the VCGCB has 
forty-five days to accept or deny a claim against the state).
84. Notice, WEST’S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW (2nd ed. 2008) (“The concept
of notice is critical to the integrity of legal proceedings . . . [and] [d]ue process requires
that legal action cannot be taken against anyone unless the requirements of notice and an
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importance of notice with respect to government claims against the state.85 
Accordingly, the Legislature should amend section 915, subdivision (b) 
of the Government Code to reflect this.  One way to accomplish this may
be through the doctrine of substantial compliance.
IV. HOW CALIFORNIA COURTS ADDRESS THE ISSUE
A. An Overview of the Substantial Compliance Doctrine
The doctrine of substantial compliance originated in case law and applies 
to technical shortcomings of the claim presentation requirements.86  In 
short, the doctrine prevents the dismissal of claims when the court determines
that a claimant has substantially complied with the claim-filing statute.87 
To determine whether there has been substantial compliance with a claim-
filing statute, “courts must determine if the purpose of the statute has been
satisfied, if there has been a bona fide attempt to comply, and whether any
opportunity to be heard are observed.”).  The judicial system has also recognized the 
important of notice in the civil procedure context.  For example, Federal Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 4 lays out the process for filing a notice of appeal.  See FED. R. APP. P. 4.  The
rule specifically states that notices of appeal for civil and criminal cases must be filed with 
the clerk of the district court. See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A); (b)(1)(A).  An issue arose, 
however, where individuals failed to comply with this procedural presentment requirement 
because they were mistakenly—yet logically—filing their notices of appeal with the
appellate court. At the heart of this requirement to present notices of appeal to the district
court is notice.  Specifically, the intention for the rule was to ensure that the appellate court 
would have notice of potential appeals.  However, if an individual presents their notice of
appeal to the appellate court, and not the district court, the appellate court still receives 
notice of the potential appeal.  To preserve fairness and the notice purpose underlying this
requirement, the rule now provides a safety-net subdivision that protects appellants if they
accidentally file their notices of appeal with the appellate court instead of with the district 
court. See FED. R. APP. P. 4(d) (“If a notice of appeal . . . is mistakenly filed in the court 
of appeals, the clerk of that court must note on the notice the date when it was received 
and send it to the district clerk. The notice is then considered filed in the district court on
the date so noted.”).
85. See Phillips v. Desert Hosp. Dist., 780 P.2d 349, 353 (Cal. 1989) (“The Legislature 
has . . . provided a comprehensive scheme which requires a claimant to notify the appropriate 
public entity of a claim.”).
86. See JUSTICE LEE SMALLEY EDMON ET AL., CAL. PRAC. GUIDE CIV. PRO. BEFORE 
TRIAL Ch. 1-C (Rutter Group 2015) (“Technical defects will not invalidate a claim so long 
as there has been ‘substantial compliance’ with the claims filing requirement.” (citing Phillips, 
780 P.2d at 353)). 
87. See id.
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prejudice to the governmental entity appears.”88  In effect, the doctrine of 
substantial compliance prevents meritorious claims from being thrown 
out. The doctrine is sometimes written into state statute provisions, but in 
the context of satisfying section 915’s claim presentation requirements, it 
is more often applied judicially.
B. Judicial Application of the Doctrine in California
Many California courts have recognized the importance of upholding the 
purpose of the claim presentation requirements.89  These courts recognize
the stringent nature of the claim presentation requirements and “have held
that where the purpose of the Government Claims Act is satisfied, it must
not be used as a trap for the unwary.”90 
Recognizing the potential trap, some courts have applied the doctrine
of “substantial compliance” as opposed to “strict compliance” to determine 
whether a claimant has satisfied the Act’s claim presentment requirements.91 
As one court stated:
[w]here there has been an attempt to comply [with the claim presentation
requirements] but the compliance is defective, the test of substantial compliance
controls.  Under this test, the court must ask whether sufficient information is
disclosed on the face of the filed claims “to reasonably enable the public entity to
make an adequate investigation of the merits of the claim and to settle it without
the expense of a lawsuit.”92 
While California courts have stressed the importance of the goals underlying
the claim presentation statute, they have also stressed, and almost uniformly
88. Jamison v. State, 107 Cal. Rptr. 496, 497 (Ct. App. 1973) (citing Insolo v.
Imperial Irr. Dist., 305 P.2d 176, 178 (Cal. 1956)), disapproved of by DiCampli-Mintz v. 
County of Santa Clara, 289 P.3d 884 (Cal. 2012). 
89. See, e.g., DiCampli-Mintz, 289 P.3d at 889 (A statute “must be given a reasonable 
and common sense interpretation consistent with the apparent purpose and intention of the 
lawmakers . . . .” (citing City of Poway v. City of San Diego, 280 Cal. Rptr. 368, 374 (Ct. 
App. 1991))).
90. MICHAEL PAUL THOMAS, ET AL., CAL. CIV. PRAC. TORTS § 30:7 (2016) (citing
Johnson v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 266 Cal. Rptr. 187, 190 (Ct. App. 1990)); see 
also Johnson, 266 Cal. Rptr. At 190 (“[T]he claims statutes which are designed to . . . 
provide an opportunity for timely investigation and encourage settling meritorious claims
should not be used as traps for the unwary when their underlying purposes have been
satisfied.” (citing Jamison, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 499)). 
91. See, e.g., Johnson v. San Diego, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 190 (noting that some courts 
apply the doctrine of substantial compliance rather than strict compliance); City of San
Jose v. Superior Court, 525 P.2d 701, 707 (Cal. 1974) (“[T]o gauge the sufficiency of a 
particular claim, two tests shall be applied: Is there some compliance with all of the 
statutory requirements; and, if so, is this compliance sufficient to constitute substantial
compliance?”). 
92. See Loehr v. Ventura Cty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 195 Cal. Rptr. 576, 583 (Ct. App. 1983) 
(quoting City of San Jose, 525 P.2d at 707). 
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held, that the doctrine of substantial compliance is inapplicable when a
claimant presents a claim to the incorrect recipient.93  California courts are 
more willing to apply the substantial compliance doctrine when there are 
defects with respect to the contents of claims than when there are defects
in the presentment of claims.94 Accordingly, in California, if claimants submit
their claims against the state directly to the responsible public entity instead 
of the VCGCB, the doctrine of substantial compliance will not save claimants 
and their suits will be barred.95 
The lack of willingness of California courts to apply substantial compliance 
to this particular claim presentation requirement is surprising, given that 
California courts have stated that when “the purposes of the claims statute
are effectuated, its requirements should be given a liberal construction in
order to permit full adjudication of the case on its merits.”96  Following 
this logic, courts should recognize that by presenting the claim directly to 
the responsible entity, the purpose of the claims statute—notice—is effectuated.
Therefore, courts should acknowledge the claimant’s substantial compliance 
and permit full adjudication on the claim, despite it being presented to the 
public entity instead of the VCGCB.
Two cases demonstrate different approaches taken by California courts 
with respect to whether substantial compliance applies when claimants
 93. See, e.g., DiCampli-Mintz, 289 P.3d at 885 (refusing to apply the doctrine of
substantial compliance where plaintiff presented her claim to the improper entity).
94. See Jamison, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 497 (“Most claim statute cases discussing the 
doctrine of substantial compliance relate to the integrity of the claim itself—the form of
the claim—as distinguished from the method of its presentment—the filing.”). California 
courts are more willing to apply the doctrine of substantial compliance to mistakes within
the claim itself, and not to the presentment of it.  See, e.g., Johnson v. County of Los Angeles,
285 P.2d 713, 716 (Cal. 1955) (finding that plaintiff substantially complied with claim 
presentation requirements of the Government Code despite her claim stating the accident
occurred on southeast corner instead of southwest corner of intersection); Rowan v. City
and County of San Francisco, 53 Cal. Rptr. 88, 91 (Ct. App. 1966) (finding that plaintiff 
substantially complied with claim presentation requirements of the Government Code
despite having described the place of accident as “3350 Scott St.” instead of “3358-3360 
Scott St.”). 
95. See, e.g., Munoz v. State, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 860, 866–70 (Ct. App. 1995) (finding
plaintiff failed to substantially comply with claim filing provisions by erroneously presenting
his application to file a late claim to the California Correctional Institution instead of the
former Board of Control); Johnson v. San Diego, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 189 (holding plaintiff
did not substantially comply with claim filing provisions by presenting his claim to former
Board of Control instead of the school district).
96. See Dilts v. Cantua Elementary Sch. Dist., 234 Cal. Rptr. 612, 615 (Ct. App. 
1987) (citing Minsky v. City of Los Angeles, 520 P.2d 726, 734 (Cal. 1974)), disapproved
of by State v. Superior Court, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 94 (Ct. App. 2003). 
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present their claims to the improper recipient. The first case, Jamison v. 
State of California (Jamison), decided in 1973, adopted a more liberal approach 
to the doctrine and applied it to a situation where the claimant presented
his claim to the incorrect entity.97  Recently, however, the California Supreme 
Court, in DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa Clara (DiCampli-Mintz), 
reaffirmed the prevalent stricter approach and held that the doctrine of
substantial compliance does not apply when claimants file their claims with 
the wrong entity, thereby overruling Jamison.98 
1. Jamison v. State of California (1973): An Attempt to 
Expand the Doctrine
In January 1971, Mr. Jamison was injured when a truck owned by the 
state of California Department of Water Resources and driven by one of 
the Department’s employees collided with his vehicle.99  Forty-three days
after the accident, Mr. Jamison’s attorney filed a claim with the Department
of Water Resources and filed suit against the Department for Mr. Jamison’s
injuries.100  In February 1972, over a year after the accident, the State of 
California filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, seeking dismissal
of the action on the ground that Mr. Jamison filed his claim with the wrong 
governmental agency.101  Specifically, the state argued that Mr. Jamison 
improperly filed his claim with the Department of Water Resources instead 
of the State Board of Control (formerly the VCGCB), as required by section
915 of the California Government Code.102  The court granted defendant’s
motion and dismissed Mr. Jamison’s suit.103
 97. See Jamison, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 499 (finding that plaintiff substantially complied
with the claim presentation requirements despite plaintiff failing to present her claim to 
the statutorily-designated recipient), disapproved of by DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa
Clara, 289 P.3d 884 (Cal. 2012) see also infra Part IV.B.1.
 98. See DiCampli-Mintz, 289 P.3d at 884; see also infra Part IV.B.2.
 99. Jamison, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 497. Note that the California Government Code is
triggered because, like Ms. Brookes in Part I of this Comment, the employee that allegedly 
caused Mr. Jamison injury was a state employee and driving a state-owned vehicle when 
he collided into Mr. Jamison.  See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
100. Jamison, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 497.  The Department of Water Resources is a state 
department that “manag[es] and protect[s] California’s water resources.”  CAL. DEP’T OF
WATER RESOURCES, http://www.water.ca.gov [https://perma.cc/2S8B-HEDP] (last visited 
Aug. 1, 2016).
101. Jamison, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 497. A motion for judgment on the pleadings is “[a] 
party’s request that the court rule in its favor based on the pleadings on file, without 
accepting evidence, as when the outcome of the case rests on the court’s interpretation of
the law.” Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
102. Jamison, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 497.  Because plaintiff improperly filed his claim with
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Mr. Jamison appealed to the Fourth District of the California Court of 
Appeal.104 The Court of Appeal addressed the issue of “whether the plaintiff 
substantially complied with the claims statute in presenting the claim to
the Department of Water Resources rather than the State Board of Control 
as required by section 915 of the Government Code.”105  The court found
that to determine if there has been substantial compliance with the claim 
presentation requirements, the court should take into consideration the 
purpose of the claims statute.106  The court stressed that the claim presentation 
statute, which requires a potential plaintiff to file a “notice of claim,” was
“designed to protect government agencies from stale and fraudulent claims, 
provide an opportunity for timely investigation, and permit settlement of
claims without the expense of needless litigation.”107  The court concluded
that “[t]here is no need to endorse a policy which renders the statute a trap
for the unwary” when the above-mentioned purposes of the statute have 
been satisfied.108  The court held that because the presentation of the claim
was timely and made in good faith “to an officer or employee of the exact 
state agency which allegedly was responsible for the tort,” Mr. Jamison
substantially complied with section 915 of the Government Code.109  The 
court went a step further and concluded that the Department of Water 
Resources had a duty “to forward the claim immediately to the State Board 
of Control.”110 The court justified this mandatory duty by noting that “any 
reasonable officer or employee of a major state agency knows, or should 
know, that if a substantial claim for damages is presented that it should be
forwarded to the Board of Control.”111
 104. Id. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. at 499.  Courts have determined that substantial compliance suffices where 
the purpose of the statute has been satisfied in contexts other than claim presentation
requirements. See, e.g., People v. Carroll, 167 Cal. Rptr. 3d 60, 62 (Ct. App. 2014) (finding
that the release agreement appellant signed substantially complied with section 1318 of 
the California Penal Code because the statute’s objectives of ensuring the accused’s future
appearance in court and protecting public safety were satisfied); Freeman v. Vista de Santa 
Barbara Assocs., LP, 144 Cal. Rptr. 3d 42, 44 (Ct. App. 2012) (determining that whether
appellant substantially complied with section 798 of the California Civil Code is dependent on
the meaning and purpose of the statute). 
107. Jamison, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 498–99 (citing Myers v. County of Orange, 86 Cal.
Rptr. 198, 204 (Ct. App. 1970)).  In coming to its ultimate decision, the court looked at
these legislative purposes and applied them to the facts of the case.  See id.
 108. Id. (citing Galbreath v. City of Indianapolis, 255 N.E.2d 225, 229 (Ind. 1970)). 
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In short, Jamison stands for the following propositions: (1) the purpose 
of the claims statute—notice to the state agency so it may settle, investigate, 
and protect itself from fraudulent claims—should be taken into consideration;
(2) claimants fulfill the notice purpose when they present their government
claims directly to the allegedly responsible state agency, rather than the 
Board of Control (former VCGCB); (3) the presentment of a claim to the state 
agency constitutes substantial compliance with the statute’s presentation 
requirements; and (4) the improper state agency has a duty to forward the
claim to the Board of Control (or VCGCB) upon receipt.112 
2. DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa Clara (2012): 
Limiting the Doctrine
Roughly forty years later, the California Supreme Court in DiCampli-
Mintz v. County of Santa Clara rejected Jamison’s application of substantial 
compliance and reaffirmed the stricter compliance approach to section 915’s
claim presentation requirements.113 While DiCampli-Mintz involves claims
against the County— the local government—under a different subsection 
of section 915, it addresses the same issue of whether filing a claim with
the incorrect recipient is fatal to a plaintiff’s lawsuit.114
 112. See generally id., disapproved of by DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa Clara, 
289 P.3d 884 (Cal. 2012). 
113. DiCampli-Mintz, 289 P.3d at 885 (rejecting the Court of Appeal’s expansion of
the statutory requirements and affirming “that a claim must satisfy the express delivery
provisions language of the statute.”).  In the years leading up to DiCampli-Mintz, other
state courts criticized the Jamison decision. See, e.g., Del Real v. City of Riverside,
115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 705, 712 (Ct. App. 2002) (declining to follow the Jamison decision
because it is at odds with section 915); Life v. County of Los Angeles, 278 Cal. Rptr. 196, 
200 (Ct. App. 1991) (finding Jamison’s analysis unpersuasive and at odds with section 915).
It is important to note that it took roughly forty years for the California Supreme Court to
overrule the Jamison decision, despite backlash from other courts. See DiCampli-Mintz, 
289 P.3d 884. This may be because these claims—claims submitted to the improper
agency—are dismissed at an early stage for failing to comply with the claim presentation 
requirements and claimants fail to appeal the decision.  Additionally, it may have taken so
long because the California Supreme Court issues opinions for very few cases each year.
See, e.g., 2015 Court Statistics Report, JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL. xiii–xiv (2015), http://www. 
courts.ca.gov/documents/2015-Court-Statistics-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z5TV-XVWE]
(providing statistics that for fiscal year 2013–2014, filings with the California Supreme 
Court totaled 7907 and the Court only issued 85 written opinions); 2011 Court Statistics
Report, JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL. xiii (2011), http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/2011Court 
StatisticsReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/CR3V-VKR9] (providing statistics that for fiscal
year 2009–2010, 9652 matters were filed with the Supreme Court and the Court issued 96 
written opinions).
114. Note that this case involves section 915, subdivision (a), of the California
Government Code, which provides the presentation requirements for claims against local
public entities (such as the County) as opposed to section 915, subdivision (b), which provides 
the presentation requirements for a claim against the state of California. See generally 
722
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In April 2006, Ms. DiCampli-Mintz underwent surgery at a hospital owned
and operated by the County of Santa Clara.115  Immediately following the
surgery, Ms. DiCampli-Mintz informed the doctors that she was experiencing
pain in her left leg.116 The doctors determined that her “‘left iliac artery’ was
‘completely interrupted.’”117 Ms. DiCampli-Mintz returned to surgery and 
was subsequently discharged.118 Later that year, Ms. DiCampli-Mintz went 
to the emergency department of the same hospital, complaining of severe
pain in her left leg.119  A doctor informed Ms. DiCampli-Mintz that she needed 
another procedure “because blood vessels had been damaged in the first
surgery.”120 
On April 3, 2007, Ms. DiCampli-Mintz’s attorney delivered letters to an 
employee of the medical staffing office located in the hospital’s administration 
building.121  The letters, which were addressed to the hospital’s Risk
Management Department, notified the department of Ms. DiCampli-Mintz’s 
suit alleging that the doctors negligently performed her surgery.122  On April 
6, 2007, the Santa Clara County Risk Management Department received
the letter.123  On April 23, 2007, Ms. DiCampli-Mintz’s attorney spoke with 
an employee of the County’s Risk Management Department.124  This employee 
allegedly confirmed receipt of the letter and gave Ms. DiCampli-Mintz’s 
counsel the name of the attorney handling the County’s defense, but did
DiCampli-Mintz, 289 P.3d 884. Both sections provide the proper recipients for their
respective types of claims. See CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 915(a), (b) (West 2012). 
115. DiCampli-Mintz, 289 P.3d at 885.  Note that the Government Claims Act is
triggered because the hospital, which allegedly caused the injury to plaintiff, is a public 
entity owned and operated by the County of Santa Clara. See GOV’T § 915(a).
116. DiCampli-Mintz, 289 P.3d at 885. 
117. Id.  “Complete interruption” of the left iliac artery refers to the stoppage of major
blood flow to the left leg. See DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa Clara, 125 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 861, 863 (Ct. App. 2011), review granted and opinion superseded, 257 P.3d 1130 (Cal. 
2011), and rev’d, 289 P.3d 884 (Cal. 2012). 
118. DiCampli-Mintz, 289 P.3d at 886. During this subsequent surgery, it “‘immediately
became apparent [to the doctors] that [Ms. DiCampli-Mintz’s] left external iliac artery was
tied and divided, as was the left iliac vein.’” See id.
 119. Id. at 885–86. 
120. Id. at 886. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. The letters were addressed to the Risk Management Department at the hospital,
as well as to Dr. Bui, and Dr. Sklar, the doctors who had performed Ms. DiCampli-Mintz’s 
first surgery. Id.  In the letter, plaintiff requested that the letter “be forwarded to the
recipient’s insurance carrier, [but] it did not request that it be forwarded to any of the
statutorily designated recipients denoted in section 915” of the Government Code. Id. 
123. Id. at 886. 
124. Id. 
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not inform counsel that the letter failed to satisfy section 915’s claim delivery
requirements.125 
On July 2, 2007, Ms. DiCampli-Mintz filed a lawsuit in state court against 
the county-owned hospital and the two doctors who performed her surgery.126 
The County subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment alleging 
that Ms. DiCampli-Mintz failed to comply with section 915 of the Government 
Code’s requirement to present her claim to the correct recipient.127  Under
the Government Code, the County was the proper recipient for this County-
owned and operated public entity hospital.128  Ms. DiCampli-Mintz argued 
that her letter to the hospital’s Risk Management Department, informing
them of her intent to sue, constituted substantial compliance with the
Government Claims Act.129  Because the letter was ultimately received by 
the Santa Clara County Risk Management Department, which was “the 
county department most directly involved with the processing and defense 
of tort claims against the County[,]” Ms. DiCampli-Mintz argued that section 
915 was satisfied.130  The trial court rejected this argument and granted 
the County’s motion for summary judgment.131 
Ms. DiCampli-Mintz appealed and the Court of Appeal reversed the trial 
court’s decision.132 Relying in part on Jamison, the appellate court held that
“a claim may substantially comply with the act, notwithstanding failure to
deliver or mail it to one of the specified recipients, if it is given to a person
or department whose functions include the management or defense of claims
against the defendant entity.”133 In finding that Ms. DiCampli-Mintz
substantially complied with the claim presentation statute, the court looked
 125. Id. It is undisputed that the county clerk never actually received the letter, which is
one of the statutorily-designated recipients for claims against the county.  Id.; see also infra note 




DiCampli-Mintz, 289 P.3d at 886. 
Id. at 887. 
128. Section 915, subdivision (a), stipulates the proper recipient for a claim against 
claim . . . shall be presented to a local public entity by either of the following means: (1) 
Delivering it to the clerk, secretary or auditor thereof. (2) Mailing it to the clerk, secretary,
auditor, or to the governing body at its principal office.”  Id.
 129. DiCampli-Mintz, 289 P.3d at 887. 
130. Id. 
131. Id.  Specifically, the trial court held that plaintiff could not escape summary
judgment because she failed “to ‘raise a reasonable inference that her claim was actually
received by the clerk, secretary, auditor or board of the local public entity within the time
prescribed for presentation thereof’ and she also failed to ‘establish waiver and/or equitable 
estoppel.’” Id. (quoting trial court order). 
132. Id. In making its decision in choosing to apply the doctrine of substantial compliance 
to Ms. DiCampli-Mintz’s procedural shortcoming, the court “rejected other Court of Appeal
cases holding that compliance is deemed satisfied only by actual receipt by the statutorily
designated persons, under section 915(e)(1).”  Id.
 133. Id. at 885. 
724
LEWIS (DO NOT DELETE) 10/22/2018 12:38 PM      
  











   
 













   
  
  









[VOL. 53:  701, 2016] Recalibrating the Scales of Justice
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
beyond the statute’s language to its underlying purpose and found that the 
notice purpose had been satisfied, and that in such a case, strict adherence 
to the statute’s language would inequitably result in a loss of substantial 
rights to Ms. DiCampli-Mintz.134 
The Supreme Court of California reversed the appellate court and concluded
that a claim against a public entity must satisfy the express language within
the claim presentment provisions of the Government Code.135  The Court
determined that, by applying the doctrine of substantial compliance to a 
situation in which a plaintiff misdirected her claim, the appellate court
“fail[ed] to adhere to the plain language of section 915” and “rewrote the 
statute to read as the court believed it should provide.”136  The Court also
addressed the Jamison decision and found its arguments unpersuasive:137 
In addition to contravening section 915‘s plain language, the Jamison rule creates
uncertainty about how and where claims must be delivered.  Misdirected claims
may be received by various departments or employees and forwarded to multiple
people and places, making it difficult to determine whether the claims were actually
delivered to, or received by, a department or employee charged with the overall
management of claims against the county.138 
The Court argued that this outcome “is contrary to the Government Claims
Act’s goal of eliminating uncertainty in the claims presentation requirements.”139 
The DiCampli-Mintz decision resulted in the following rule: to satisfy
the presentation requirements of the Act, claimants must under section 
915(a), present their claims to (1) the statutorily designated public entity under
section 915(a); or (2) claims must actually be received by the statutorily
134. DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa Clara, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 861, 874–76 (Ct. 
App. 2011), review granted and opinion superseded, 257 P.3d 1130 (Cal. 2011), and
rev’d, 289 P.3d 884 (Cal. 2012) (“The gist of the substantial compliance doctrine is that 
in appropriate cases courts will look beyond the terms of a statute to consult its underlying 
purpose, particularly where strict adherence will result in the loss of important rights.”).
135. See DiCampli-Mintz, 289 P.3d at 885.
 136. See id. at 889. 
137. See id. at 890–92 (concluding that “Jamison proves too slender a reed to support 
the weight of the Court of Appeal’s expansion.”).  The Court stressed that 
Jamison is unpersuasive because it fails to follow the statutory language specifically
identifying who must actually receive a claim. Finding compliance when any agency
employee is served exponentially expands the scope of the statute.  By placing 
a duty on a public employee who receives a misdirected claim to forward it to 
the proper agency, Jamison improperly shifted the responsibility for presenting 
a claim from the claimant to the public entity.
Id. at 892.
 138. Id. 
139. Id.
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designated public entity pursuant to section 915(e).140  If neither option is
satisfied, the claimant’s suit will be barred.141  The California Supreme Court 
appeared to focus more on compliance with the plain language of the statute 
to ensure uniformity, and less on the notice purpose underlying it, even
though uniformity and notice were both purported goals of the statute.142 
V. THE NEED TO RECONCILE DICAMPLI-MINTZ AND JAMISON
It is important to recognize Jamison’s focus on legislative intent—given
that the purpose of the claims presentation requirements is notice—but it 
is also important to recognize DiCampli-Mintz’s emphasis on the clear
and unambiguous language of the statute in light of the Act’s goal to create 
uniform easy-to-follow requirements.
In DiCampli-Mintz, the California Supreme Court correctly determined 
that the language of section 915, subdivision (b) is clear and unambiguous; 
the language clearly states that a claimant must present a claim against the 
state to the VCGCB.143  Despite this clear and unambiguous language,
noncompliance persists, and claimants continue to misdirect their claims 
and present to the public entity itself, rather than to the VCGCB.144 
Perhaps noncompliance with this requirement continues because pro se 
plaintiffs are unaware of the claim presentation requirements or do not 
understand them.145  Perhaps it continues because of indolent attorneys failing 
to research the necessary law.  Regardless, it is well-settled in our judicial 
140. Year-in-Review, 40 W. ST. U. L. REV. 235, 237 (2013).  In other words, after
DiCampli-Mintz, “there must [either] be strict compliance with § 915(a) or the only way
to ‘substantially comply’ with § 915(a) is if there is actual receipt of the misdirected claim
by one of the statutorily designated recipients (i.e., § 915(e)).”  Jefferson v. City of
Fremont, No. C-12-0926 EMC, 2013 WL 1747917, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2013). So, 
if applying this same reasoning in the context of claims against the state, there must either 
be strict compliance with § 915(b) or substantial compliance by satisfying § 915(e), that 
is, actual receipt by the designated recipient, the VCGCB. 
141. See, e.g., DiCampli-Mintz, 289 P.3d at 889 (affirming lower court’s decision to 
dismiss plaintiff’s claim against the county after noncompliance with section 915(a) and 
915(c) of the Government Code). 
142. See id. at 889 (overruling the Court of Appeal because it failed to adhere to the
plain language of section 915).  But see supra Part III.A (explaining that the goal of the 
claim presentation requirements is to give notice to the affected public entity).
143. See DiCampli-Mintz, 289 P.3d at 889; see also CAL. GOV’T CODE § 915(b) (West 
2012).
144. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
145. “Even those pro se litigants who are prepared for court lack the legal knowledge 
and expertise to deal with even the most basic court proceedings.”  Brenda Star Adams,
Unbundled Legal Services: A Solution to the Problems Caused by Pro Se Litigation in 
Massachusetts’s Civil Courts, 40 NEW ENG. L. REV. 303, 309 (2005). 
726
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system that ignorance of the law is no excuse.146  Pro se plaintiffs are generally 
held to the same standard as those represented by counsel, and attorneys 
have an obligation to research the relevant law in order to zealously advocate
for their client.147  Accordingly, any statutory change should not reward those
who fail to comply with the clear language of the statute; rather, change is
necessary because our judicial system also recognizes the importance of 
fundamental fairness and the preservation of legislative intent.148  Change
is warranted because the purpose of the statute—notice—is being disregarded, 
and potential plaintiffs are losing their fundamental right to have their day 
in court.149 
By relying heavily on the unambiguous language of the statute, the 
California Supreme Court in DiCampli-Mintz overlooked the statute’s 
underlying intent of providing notice.150  The Court stressed that the express
language of the statute is dispositive and there is no need to look to legislative
 146. See, e.g., Felder v. Johnson, 204 F.3d 168, 172 (5th Cir. 2000) (“‘[I]gnorance of
the law, even for an incarcerated pro se petitioner, generally does not excuse prompt filing.’” 
(quoting Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 714 (5th Cir. 1999))); People v. Marschalk, 23 Cal.
Rptr. 743, 746 (Ct. App. 1962) (“It is the general rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse.”);
In re Hein’s Estate, 90 P.2d 100, 102–03 (Cal. Ct. App. 1939) (“In neither a criminal nor 
civil cause, in any circumstance, can one justify his act by the naked showing that he did
not know of the existence of the law.  Ignorance of the law is no excuse is a rule in our 
jurisprudence.”).
147. See 7A C.J.S. Attorney & Client § 247 (2015) (“Generally, one who undertakes
presentation of one’s own case has no greater right than other litigants but must expect and 
receive the same treatment and consideration as if represented by an attorney and must be 
prepared to accept the consequences of one’s own incompetence, mistakes, and errors. A 
party appearing pro se is to be treated as any other party and can expect no special treatment
nor be afforded any special consideration.  Basically, pro se litigants are held to the same
standards as those represented by an attorney. Pro se litigants are presumed to have full
knowledge of applicable court rules and procedures, including procedural deadlines with
respect to filing motions, even if they lack understanding of those rules or correct procedures
or are unfamiliar with them.”).
148. See, e.g., Freedland v. Greco, 289 P.2d 463, 466 (Cal. 1955) (“Taking into
consideration the policies and purposes of the act, the applicable rule of statutory 
construction is that the purpose sought to be achieved and evils to be eliminated has an
important place in ascertaining the legislative intent.” (citing Wotton v. Bush, 261 P.2d 
256, 260 (Cal. 1953))); People v. Centr-O-Mart, 214 P.2d 378, 379 (Cal. 1950) (“Words 
of a statute must be given such interpretation as will promote rather than defeat the general 
purpose and policy of the law.” (citing Dep’t of Motor Vehicles v. Indus. Accident Comm’n,
93 P.2d 131, 134 (Cal. 1939))). 
149. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948) (“[A]n opportunity to be heard in his 
defense—a right to his day in court—are basic in our system of jurisprudence . . . .”). 
150. See generally DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa Clara, 289 P.3d 884 (Cal. 2012).
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intent when the language is clear and unambiguous.151  Nevertheless, the
Court still looked to the legislative intent of the statute and stated that “[s]ection 
915(a)(1) reflects the Legislature’s intent to precisely identify those who
may receive claims on behalf of a local public entity” and  “reflects the 
Legislature’s intent that a misdirected claim will satisfy the presentation 
requirement if the claim is ‘actually received’ by a statutorily designated 
recipient.”152  The Court thus concluded that “compliance with section 
915(e)(1) requires actual receipt of the misdirected claim by one of the 
designated recipients.”153  What the Court failed to recognize or address, 
however, is that plaintiffs’ misdirected claims rarely make their way to the
correct entity because public entities and their defense attorneys are not
required to forward the claim to the correct recipient, the VCGCB.  The
County’s Risk Management Department employee indicated to Ms. DiCampli­
Mintz’s counsel that the County had a defense attorney handling the case.154 
Instead of notifying the plaintiff of her mistake or forwarding the claim to 
the correct recipient, the defense attorney waited and filed a motion for
summary judgment to have the case dismissed.155  It is accurate that section 
915(e)(1) saves the claimant who presents a claim to the wrong entity, but
only if the proper entity eventually receives the claim within the statutory 
period.156  This is unlikely to occur if there is no requirement for the public
entity or defense attorneys to inform the claimant of their mistake.
In short, the Court of Appeal in Jamison justifiably incorporated the statute’s
purpose of notice in its analysis to determine whether the plaintiff substantially
complied with the claim presentation requirements under section 915.157
 151. See id. at 889 (“If the language [of a statute] is clear and unambiguous there is
no need for construction, nor is it necessary to resort to indicia of the intent of the Legislature[.]”
(quoting S.B. Beach Properties v. Berti, 138 P.3d 713, 716 (Cal. 2006))). 
152. Id.  Section 915(a) of the California Government Code provides: “A claim, any
amendment thereto, or an application to the public entity for leave to present a late claim 
shall be presented to a local public entity by either of the following means: (1) Delivering 
it to the clerk, secretary or auditor thereof [or] (2) Mailing it to the clerk, secretary, auditor,
or to the governing body at its principal office.”  CAL. GOV’T CODE § 915(a)(1)–(2) (West 
2012). Section 915(e)(1) states: “A claim, amendment or application shall be deemed to
have been presented in compliance with this section even though it is not delivered or 
mailed as provided in this section if, within the time prescribed for presentation thereof . . .
(1) It is actually received by the clerk, secretary, auditor or board of the local public entity.” 
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 915(e)(1) (West 2012). 
153. DiCampli-Mintz, 289 P.3d at 889. See infra Part VI.A, for a further discussion of
section 915, subdivision (e) of the California Government Code. 
154. DiCampli-Mintz, 289 P.3d at 886. 
155. See id. at 887.
156. Substantial compliance under section 915(e) “demands that the misdirected claim
be ‘actually received’ by the appropriate person or board.”  Life v. County of Los Angeles, 
278 Cal. Rptr. 196, 200 (Ct. App. 1991). 
157. The Jamison court was correct in doing so since it is important to consider the 
underlying purpose of a statute when interpreting and applying it.  See Dep’t of Motor Vehicles
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Although the California Supreme Court in DiCampli-Mintz justifiably stressed
the need for clear and unambiguous language to ensure uniformity with
respect to filing government claims against the state,158 noncompliance
continues to be an issue despite the clear and unambiguous language of the 
statute.159  Claimants continue to misdirect their claims and present to the
public entity itself, rather than the VCGCB.160 
The solution is to reconcile the concerns of DiCampli-Mintz and Jamison. 
California needs to maintain the clear and unambiguous language of the 
statute, but also needs to support the legislative intent of both uniformity and 
providing notice.  Both courts were correct in different ways; however, the
California Supreme Court in DiCampli-Mintz justifiably noted that the change 
must come from the Legislature.161  Therefore, the Legislature should amend
section 915 to reflect the statute’s legislative intent of notice, while maintaining 
the unambiguous language that the California Supreme Court stressed. 
VI. SOLUTIONS
Fairness and fulfillment of the Act’s legislative intent require changes 
to the current section 915, subdivision (b), of the Government Code.  This 
section will discuss three potential solutions, but will ultimately advocate 
for the third option as the superior solution.
A. Substantial Compliance Doctrine Written into the Statute
Given that California courts have been unwilling to apply the doctrine 
of substantial compliance when claimants present their claim to the public 
entity instead of the statutorily designated recipient, such as the VCGCB, one 
possible solution is to codify and expand the substantial compliance doctrine.162 
The current section 915 contains a subpart that attempts to relax the claim 
presentation requirements for claims against the state.163  Without including the
term “substantial compliance,” the subpart provides one circumstance under 
v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 93 P.2d 131, 134 (1939) (“[I]t is a cardinal rule of construction 
that words must be given such interpretation as will promote rather than defeat the general 
purpose and policy of the law.”). 
158. See DiCampli-Mintz, 289 P.3d at 892. 
159. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
160. Id. 
161. See DiCampli-Mintz, 289 P.3d at 890. 
162. Some states, such as Washington, have the doctrine of substantial compliance 
incorporated into their government claims statutes. See infra pp. 731–32.
163. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 915(e) (West 2012). 
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which claimants are deemed to have substantially complied with the claim 
presentation requirements, even if the claim against the state is not first
presented to the VCGCB.164  Section 915, subdivision (e) reads as follows: 
A claim, amendment, or application shall be deemed to have been presented in
compliance with this section even though it is not delivered or mailed as provided
in this section if, within the time prescribed for presentation thereof . . . [i]t is actually
received at an office of the Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board.165 
This subpart means that claimants with misdirected claims can comply with 
section 915 so long as the VCGCB ultimately receives the claim within the 
statutory time period.166 
This “actual notice” exception is common among other states’ government
claims statutes as well.167  For example, Minnesota’s government tort claims
statute provides that “[a]ctual notice of sufficient facts to reasonably put 
the state or its insurer on notice of a possible claim complies with the notice
requirements of this section.”168  It is questionable, however, if this “actual 
notice” exception actually makes a difference.  Claims presented directly to 
public entities, and not to the VCGCB, rarely make their way to the VCGCB 
unless claimants themselves notice their mistake.169  Defense attorneys for 
the state are in no hurry to inform claimants of their mistake in failing to 
present their claim to the VCGCB, given that this mistake warrants dismissing 
claimants’ cause of action entirely.170 
One option is to add a subpart to section 915, subdivision (b) requiring
liberal construction of the claim presentation requirements, thereby statutorily
requiring substantial compliance.  For example, a substantial compliance 
subpart was added to Washington’s claim presentation requirements statute,
which reads: “[w]ith respect to the content of claims under this section and 
all procedural requirements in this section, this section must be liberally
construed so that substantial compliance will be deemed satisfactory.”171
 164. Id.
 165. Id.
166. This is the result when one reads section 915, subdivision (b), and section 915, 
subdivision (e), together. 
167. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258, § 4 (West 2015) (“[a]ctual notice” exception 
written into Massachusetts government claims statute); see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 3.736
(West 2015) (“[a]ctual notice” exception written into Minnesota’s government claims statute); 
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-16 (West 2015) (“[a]ctual notice” exception written into New Mexico’s
government claims statute).
168. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 3.736(5). 
169. See, e.g., Jamison v. State, 107 Cal. Rptr. 496, 499 (Ct. App. 1973) (noting that 
“normally, the internal handling of the claim will be known only to the entity”), disapproved of
by DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa Clara, 289 P.3d 884 (Cal. 2012). 
170. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 950.2 (West 2012). 
171. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.92.100(3) (West 2015) (emphasis added).  The 
purpose underlying Washington’s claim presentation statute is also to provide notice so
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However, despite its inclusive language—“all procedural requirements”— 
Washington courts have nevertheless stated that they will only liberally 
construe the contents of the claim against the state and permit substantial 
compliance with the content requirements for the claim.172  The Washington 
courts maintain that they will apply “strict compliance” to the requirements 
for filing a claim, just as California courts currently do.173 
To avoid Washington’s inconsistency with regard to its application of 
the substantial compliance doctrine, the statutory amendment would have 
to specifically emphasize that “when a claimant timely presents a claim 
directly to the state entity that is responsible for the alleged harm, and not
the VCGCB, that claimant has substantially complied with the statute’s 
claim presentation requirements.” However, despite expressly limiting the
doctrine of substantial compliance to this specific circumstance, the
amendment could still foster confusion and noncompliance.  Given that 
the goal of the statute is to provide state entities notice of potential lawsuits,
the claimant would have to present the claim to an appropriate person— 
someone who will know what to do with the claim and ensure that the state 
entity actually receives notice, thereby enabling the agency to commence
its investigation.174  Statutorily designating the appropriate recipients within 
each state entity would be cumbersome and would deviate from the Act’s
goal of uniformity. Inversely, stating generally that the claim must be presented
to “an agent authorized to accept the claim” is too vague and would result
in confusion for claimants.175 
A possible way to prevent this confusion is to relax the burden on claimants 
to present a claim to the proper agent within the state entity, and shift the 
burden partially onto the state entity itself by requiring that the entity 
that the public entity can engage in early investigation of the claim.  See Renner v. City of
Marysville, 230 P.3d 569, 571 (Wash. 2010) (“The claim filing statute is intended to provide
local governments with notice of potential tort claims, the identity of the claimant, and general
information about the claim.”).
172. See, e.g., Schoonover v. State, 64 P.3d 677, 681 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003) (first citing
Shannon v. State, 40 P.3d 1200, 1202 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002); and then Levy v. State, 957
P.2d 1272, 1276 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998)). 
173. See, e.g., id. The Shannon court even acknowledges that this seems “harsh and
technical.”  Shannon, 40 P.3d at 1202 (“While the filing requirements are not so rigid as 
to demand unjust results, compliance is mandatory even if the requirements seem ‘harsh
and technical.’” (quoting Levy, 957 P.2d at 1276)). 
174. The DiCampli-Mintz Court raised these concerns.  See supra note 137 and
accompanying text.
175. See id. (raising concerns about confusion regarding who an appropriate person
is to receive a claim within an entity).
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forward the claim to the VCGCB upon receipt.  After all, attorneys representing 
public entities are far more accustomed to the Act’s stringent claim presentation 
requirements than claimants, and would know that the proper recipient of 
claims against the state is the VCGCB.176 




If a claimant presents a claim to the public entity responsible for the
alleged harm, the public entity has received notice of the claim directly in 
accordance with the statute’s purpose.177 Under this proposed statutory 
amendment, the fact that a claimant submitted a claim to the public entity 
directly, instead of the VCGCB, would be enough to constitute substantial 
compliance with the statute because the notice purpose has been satisfied.
Because of the VCGCB’s important function in the government claims
process, claims would still need to reach the VCGCB in a timely manner.178 
Accordingly, this statutory amendment would impose a mandatory duty
on defense attorneys to forward the misdirected claim to the VCGCB.  This
would ensure that the public entity and the VCGCB receive notice.  As a 
result, the public entity can begin investigating the claim and the VCGCB 
can assist in its possible resolution. 
While this statutory amendment preserves the statute’s legislative intent,
certain concerns cast doubt as to whether this is the best possible solution. 
One issue is the justification for placing this burden on the defense to
forward the claim to the VCGCB.179  One potential justification for placing 
this duty on defense attorneys is that the attorneys representing the state
entities are well-versed in the Government Claims Act and are familiar with 
the strict claim presentation requirements, whereas plaintiffs, especially 
176. See Jamison v. State, 107 Cal. Rptr. 496, 499 (Ct. App. 1973) (noting that “any
reasonable officer or employee of a major state agency knows, or should know, that if a 
substantial claim for damages is presented that it should be forwarded to the Board of
Control.”), disapproved of by DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa Clara, 289 P.3d 884
(Cal. 2012).
177. See, e.g., Connelly v. County of Fresno, 52 Cal. Rptr. 3d 720, 727 (Ct. App. 2006) 
(stating the purpose of the claims statute is “to give the public entity timely notice of the nature 
of the claim so that it may investigate and settle those having merit without litigation.”
(quoting Santee v. Santa Clara Cty. Office of Educ., 269 Cal. Rptr. 605, 611 (Ct. App. 1990))). 
178. The VCGCB must eventually receive the claim so that it can help process the 
claim, and begin working with the state entity to reach possible early resolution of the case.
See How to File a Claim Against the State, supra note 56. 
179. The DiCampli-Mintz Court recognized this issue. See DiCampli-Mintz, 289 P.3d at
892 (“By placing a duty on a public employee who receives a misdirected claim to forward 
it to the proper agency, Jamison improperly shifted the responsibility for presenting a 
claim from the claimant to the public entity.”). 
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those proceeding pro se, are not.180  Nevertheless, ignorance of the law is no 
excuse, and pro se litigants are supposed to be held to the same standards as 
lawyers.181 
Concerns may also arise as to whether this mandatory duty violates
attorneys’ duties to their clients if they are helping plaintiffs to properly
file claims with the VCGCB.182  After all, it is not the fault of defense attorneys
or the public entity that claims are filed incorrectly. However, if there were
a statute requiring the public entity’s counsel to forward the claim, there 
would no longer be an issue of malpractice because the attorneys must
follow the law.183 
Another issue is predicting whether imposing this mandatory duty 
would even make a difference.  Would defense attorneys actually forward
the claim to the VCGCB or would they deny having received the claim?
This may result in claimants having the burden of proving that the public
entity actually received and had notice of the claim.184  This would be a
difficult burden for the claimant to overcome and could potentially result 
in the same problem of the claimant’s suit becoming barred.185  Moreover, 
there is the risk that attorneys will not forward the claim until after the statute 
of limitations has run.  Another issue is the difficulty in enforcing this type
180. This is the view that the Jamison court took.  See supra note 176.  “Pro se” is Latin 
for “[f[or oneself” or  “on one’s own behalf” and typically describes a litigant proceeding 
without an attorney.  Pro Se, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
181. See Doran v. Dreyer, 299 P.2d 661, 662 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956) (“A litigant has a 
right to act as his own attorney but, in so doing, should be restricted to the same rules of 
evidence and procedure as is required of those qualified to practice law before our courts; 
otherwise, ignorance is unjustly rewarded.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)). 
182. A basic principle underlying the Model Rules of Professional Conduct is a “lawyer’s
obligation to zealously protect and pursue a client’s legitimate interests, within the bounds 
of the law, while maintaining a professional, courteous and civil attitude toward all persons 
involved in the legal system.” Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Preamble & Scope,
AM BAR ASS’N (1983), http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/ 
publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct/model_rules_of_professional_conduct_
preamble_scope.html [https://perma.cc/5ZJQ-EEKM]. 
183. See id. (“[I]t is . . . a lawyer’s duty to uphold legal process”). 
184. See, e.g., Westcon Const. Corp. v. County of Sacramento, 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 89, 
102 (Ct. App. 2007) (finding that the plaintiff had the burden of proving the county had 
actual notice of his claim).  
185. See Garber v. City of Clovis, 698 F. Supp. 2d 1204, 1215 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (citing 
Jamison v. State, 107 Cal. Rptr. 496, 499 (Ct. App. 1973), disapproved of by DiCampli-
Mintz v. County of Santa Clara, 289 P.3d 884 (Cal. 2012)) (stating claimant has the burden 
of proving actual notice).  The Jamison court also noted that this “burden is a difficult 
one.” Jamison, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 499. 
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of mandatory duty and establishing appropriate punishment for attorney
noncompliance.186 
An alternative solution is to impose a mandatory duty on the public entity,
rather than the defense attorney, to forward the claim to the VCGCB.187 
Generally, government claims do not reach defense counsel until the lawsuit
has been filed and served.188  Before a claim reaches the attorney representing 
the public entity, it reaches the public entity itself.189 Perhaps the best solution 
is to resolve the issue of misdirected claims before the defective claim 
even gets into the defense attorney’s hands.  However, concerns arise here
as well because claimants may present their claims to an improper person
within the entity—a person who does not know what to do with the claim 
—and therefore does not know he or she is supposed to forward it to the 
VCGCB.190  Additionally, this would result in claimants bearing the heavy 
burden of proving that they delivered their claim to someone within the entity,
as well as the risk that the statute of limitations will have run by the time 
the entity actually forwards the claim.191 




Given the concerns surrounding the statutory amendments proposed thus
far, the best solution is to create an expansive yet sensible reconstruction 
186. This efficacy issue been raised in the context of mandatory reporting statutes. 
See, e.g., Carolyn L. Dessin, Should Attorneys Have A Duty to Report Financial Abuse of 
the Elderly?, 38 AKRON L. REV. 707, 708–09 (2005) (noting that some believe mandatory
reporting statutes are ineffective because failure to report is rarely prosecuted).  The issue 
has also been discussed in the context of attorneys’ duty to report professional misconduct. 
See Nikki A. Ott & Heather F. Newton, A Current Look at Model Rule 8.3: How Is It Used 
and What Are Courts Doing About It?, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 747, 756–57 (2003)
(explaining the ineffectiveness of the duty imposed by Rule 8.3 of the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct, which requires lawyers to report other lawyers or judges who have
engaged in unethical behavior, due to lack of enforcement). 
187. The Jamison court advocated for this type of mandatory duty. See Jamison, 
107 Cal. Rptr. at 499 (finding that the employee that was served had a duty to forward the 
claim immediately to the State Board of Control). 
188. See supra note 169 and accompanying text. 
189. Id.  The VCGCB notifies the state department that is being sued, not necessarily
the attorney representing the department. See How to File a Claim Against the State, supra
note 56 (“Often, the [VCGCB] works closely with the affected department in an effort to
resolve the matter.”).
190. This is the same concern that the DiCampli-Mintz Court addressed.  See DiCampli- 
Mintz v. County of Santa Clara, 289 P.3d 884, 892 (Cal. 2012) (concluding that “[t]he question
of when a claim is actually received and whether a specific department or employee managed 
claims against a public entity would also be fodder for litigation” and finding that this would be
“contrary to the Government Claims Act’s goal of eliminating uncertainty in the claims
presentation requirements”).
191. See supra note 185. 
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of section 915, subdivision (b) and improve the method for processing claims.
This amendment considers the notice purpose of the statute—which enables 
entities to investigate, settle, and avoid fraudulent claims—that was stressed 
in Jamison, and the need for clear and unambiguous language stressed in 
DiCampli-Mintz, but would eliminate many of the concerns that the
aforementioned “statutory imposed substantial compliance” or “mandatory 
duty” amendment would potentially pose.  In constructing this statutory
amendment, it is important to look to other states’ government claims statutes
for guidance.
1. Other States’ Designated Recipients for Claims Against the State
There is considerable variation among the states when it comes to
presentation requirements for claims against the state and its employees,
specifically regarding the proper recipient of these claims.  Some states
have an administrative office or board analogous to California’s VCGCB.192 
Many states require claimants to file their government claims with the Office 
or Division of Risk Management.193 However, the majority of states require 
that claimants first file their claims with either the state’s Attorney General
(AG) or the public entity that allegedly caused the harm to the claimant.194
 192. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 19-10-208 (2015) (requiring government claims 
against the State of Arkansas be filed with the Arkansas State Claims Commission); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 44.110 (West 2016) (requiring government claims against the State of
Kentucky be filed with the Board of Claims). 
193. See, e.g., OKLA.STAT. tit. 51 § 156 (West 2016) (providing procedural requirements
to bring forth government claims against state of Oklahoma); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.6 
(2016) (setting procedural requirements to bring forth government claims against state of
Virginia); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.92.100 (LexisNexis 2016) (setting forth procedural 
requirements to file government claim against state of Washington). 
194. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-821.01 (2016) (requiring that claims against 
the state of Arizona be presented to the AG); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-10-109 (West
2016) (requiring that claims against the state of Colorado be presented to the AG); IND.
CODE ANN. § 34-13-3-6 (West 2016) (requiring that claims against the state of Indiana be 
presented to the AG or state agency); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8107 (West 2016)
(requiring that claims against the state of Maine be presented with the allegedly responsible 
public entity and the AG); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 258, § 4 (West 2016) (requiring 
that claims against the state of Massachusetts be presented to the executive officer of the
allegedly responsible public employer); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 3.736 (West 2016) (requiring 
that claims against the state of Minnesota be presented to the AG and State Employee); 
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.036 (West 2015) (requiring that claims against the state of 
Nevada be presented to AG); N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 10 (McKinney 2015), https://www.nycourts.
gov/COURTS/nyscourtofclaims/claimsact.shtml#Section10 [https://perma.cc/L8D5-8M9L]
(requiring that claims against the state of New York be presented to the AG).
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Some states require that claims be presented to both the AG and the allegedly
responsible public entity, while others require that the claimant present
the claim to only one of them.195  Some states even require that claims be
presented to the state employee that allegedly caused their harm.196 
It is important to note that relatively few states require that claims against
the state first be presented to an agency comparable to California’s VCGCB, 
while those that do, allow presentation to either that designated agency or
the AG.197  A majority of states find that presenting government claims to 
the AG or the public entity sufficiently provides the public entity with adequate 
notice and time to investigate the claim.198 After all, there is likely no better 
way to give notice to the public entity than by directly notifying the public 
entity or the AG, who is generally the statutory attorney for these public 
entities.199 
2. Necessary Changes to Reach the Best Solution
a. Change #1: Claims Should Be Presented to the Public 
Entity, Not the VCGCB
The purposes underlying most, if not all, states’ claims statutes, are the 
same as California’s.200  States continually assert that the claims statutes were
created to: (1) provide state entities with the opportunity to investigate potential 
plaintiffs’ claims; (2) provide opportunities to settle cases and thus avoid
costly litigation; (3) avoid similar injury and future claims; and (4) institute 
an organized and uniform procedure for handling government claims.201 
Despite having the same purported goals behind the claim presentation statutes,
other states’ statutes differ from California’s when it comes to the proper 
195. See supra note 194. 
196. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 3.736 (West 2016) (requiring that claims against 
the state of Minnesota be presented to both the AG and State Employee). 
197. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.6 (West 2016) (stating that claims against the 
state of Virginia “shall be filed with the Director of the Division of Risk Management or
the Attorney General . . . .”). 
198. See supra note 194. 
199. About the Office of the Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN.,
https://oag.ca.gov/office [https://perma.cc/CCM3-JS36] (last visited Aug. 1, 2016) (“The 
Attorney General . . . serves as legal counsel to state officers and, with few exceptions, to 
state agencies, boards and commissions.”).  For exceptions, see CAL. GOV’T CODE § 1041
(West 2012).
200. See, e.g., State v. Brooks, 534 P.2d 271, 274 (Ariz. 1975) (stating the goals 
behind Arizona’s claims statutes); Rodriguez v. Cambridge Hous. Auth., 795 N.E.2d 1, 6
(Mass. App. Ct. 2003) (stating the goals behind Massachusetts’s government claims act
(citing Martin v. Commonwealth, 760 N.E.2d 313, 316 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002))), aff’d, 823
N.E.2d 1249 (Mass. 2005). 
201. See Rodriguez, 795 N.E.2d at 6.
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recipient for claims against the state.202  As mentioned above, a majority
of the states require that claimants present their claims to the AG or the state
entity whose act or omission is said to have caused the injury.203  Given
that the purposes of other states’ claim statutes center on notice, these states
must find that presenting government claims to the AG or the allegedly 
responsible state entity accomplishes the notice purpose of the statute. 
The best solution to ensure that claimants get just results when filing claims
against the state is to mirror these other states’ laws on the proper recipient 
of the claim, but with a minor difference.  Claims against the state should
be presented directly to the public entity to respect the notice purpose of 
the presentation requirement.204  However, concerns could arise if the statute
designates the responsible entity as the proper recipient generally, because 
the claim would need to be presented to an appropriate person within that 
state entity.  Accordingly, the amendment should require that the claim be
presented to the allegedly responsible public entity, but should also clearly
designate to whom within that entity the claim should be presented to
eliminate confusion and maintain uniformity.205 
b. 	Change #2: Create Individualized Government Claims Offices Within 
Each Public Entity to Process Claims, Instead of the VCGCB
In addition to amending the statute to require that claims against the state
be presented to the responsible public entity, the second necessary change 
is to withdraw the VCGCB’s role in administering the Government Claims
Act. It is irrefutable that the VCGCB plays a vital role in the filing process
for government claims.206 The VCGCB processes potential plaintiffs’ claims
against the state and assesses their legal viability.207  The VCGCB also assists
 202. 	See supra notes 192–94 and accompanying text. 
203. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 34-13-3-6 (West 2016) (stating that claims against 
the state of Indiana will be “barred unless notice is filed with the attorney general or the
state agency involved . . . .”); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8107(3)(A) (West 2016) (stating
that claims against the state of Maine shall be filed with the “state department, board,
agency, commission, or authority whose act or omissions is said to have caused the injury
and the Attorney General.”).
204. 	See supra Part III.A. 
205. 	See supra notes 174–75 and accompanying text. 
206. See Annual Report 09–10, CAL. VICTIM COMPENSATION & GOV’T CLAIMS BD. 
28 (2011), http://vcgcb.ca.gov/docs/reports/AnnualReport-FY-0910.pdf [https://perma.cc/
R3ZY-RNZS] (“The program staff play an important role by processing claims in a timely
manner as required by statute.”). 
207. 	See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
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in reaching early resolution of claims against state government employees 
and agencies.208 These functions are of extreme importance because without 
them, individuals and state agencies would be deprived of the administrative 
opportunity to potentially resolve tort and contract claims before costly
litigation is incurred.209  These functions must remain, but a body within
the public entity itself should effectuate them.210 
Instead of the VCGCB administering the Act, each state agency should
have its own government claims office (GCO) handle government claims 
for the respective individualized entity.  For example, the Department
of Water Resources would have its own GCO handle claims specifically 
against the Department of Water Resources.  The sole purpose of these claims
offices would be to process government claims against the respective 
department or state agency.  These individualized offices would serve the 
same function as the VCGCB, as they would provide individuals and state 
agencies the administrative opportunity to process and resolve claims before 
costly litigation.211 
It would be more effective for these GCOs, which would be a part of their 
respective public entities, to handle government claims for two reasons.  First,
potential plaintiffs are aware that the public entity exists because it is the one
that has allegedly caused the plaintiff harm.  However, potential plaintiffs 
may not be aware that the VCGCB exists, which may be why—despite the 
clear language of section 915(b)—plaintiffs erroneously present their claims
directly to the public entity.  Second, it is more effective for these GCOs to 
handle government claims because it would reduce the number of agencies 
that have to be involved in the claim presentment process.212  Naturally, the 
state agency has to be involved because the claim is against the state
 208. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
209. Without the VCGCB, there would be no board or comparable agency to administer
the Government Claims Act on behalf of the state. See About the Board, supra note 46
(explaining that the VCGCB is the entity that administers government claims on behalf the
state).
210.  This Comment is not advocating for the elimination of the VCGCB altogether. 
It is important to keep the VCGCB for its many other vital functions and responsibilities. 
See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text.  This Comment only advocates the withdrawal
of the VCGCB’s role in enforcing the Government Claims Act.
211. See supra Part II.C.
212. It is important to note that transferring this responsibility to the GCO within each
agency would not waste the agency’s resources.  The VCGCB’s role in assessing government 
claims is to make sure they comply procedurally; the VCGCB does not assess the merits 
of the claim.  See supra note 56 and accompanying text.  The people within the GCO at each 
agency would be familiar with these procedural requirements and how to assess the adequacy
of claims, and, therefore, the process would not be burdensome. 
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agency.213  By having GCOs within each stage agency, there is no longer
a need for a third party to be involved, and the delay that results from having 
a third party process the claim will therefore be eliminated.  If the goal is 
earlier resolution, it is more effective to have the two parties—the potential
plaintiff and the state agency—communicate directly because back-and­
forth communication with the third party and hearings with the third party
to discuss the claims would be eliminated.
Furthermore, early resolution benefits not only the public entities, but the 
claimants as well.  Having a GCO within each department will allow the 
department to address valid claims more efficiently, thereby prompting
settlement before the claimant has incurred litigation costs.214  Moreover,
if the claim is not meritorious, the claimant will receive rejection of the 
claim quicker via the GCO, thereby allowing the claimant to seek judicial
intervention without delay.215  Additionally, because these GCOs would be
in-house, they would have ready access to witnesses and documentary evidence
and thus would be in the best position to assess the validity of the claim.216 
3. Proposed Statutory Amendment and its Benefits
The statutory solution that this Comment recommends would amend 
section 915, subdivision (b) to read as follows: 
(b)	 A claim, any amendment thereto, or an application for leave to file a late claim
shall be presented to the state by either of the following means:
(1) 	 Personally delivering it to the Government Claims Office within the
specific state entity whose act or omission is said to have caused the 
injury.
213. Because the VCGCB currently works closely with the affected public entity and 
the public entity is a potential defendant to a lawsuit, the public entity, naturally, must be 
involved in the claims process.  See supra note 189 and accompanying text. 
214. See Court Statistics Project, Caseload Highlights: Estimating the Cost of Civil 
Litigation, Nat’l Ctr. for St. Cts. 5–6 (Jan. 2013), http://www.courtstatistics.org/~/media/ 
microsites/files/csp/data%20pdf/csph_online2.ashx [https://perma.cc/QB9C-VT7J] (showing
that the cost of litigation rises as a lawsuit moves past the settlement phase).
215. Because the claim would be presented directly to the GCO within the affected
public entity, the need for a public hearing and the time delay associated with that would be
eliminated. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
216. This follows logically because the GCOs would be within the affected public 
agency and could readily contact those involved with the act or omission that gave rise to 
the suit.
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(2)	 Mailing it by certified mail with return receipt requested to the Government
Claims Office within the specific state entity whose act or omission is
said to have caused the injury.217 
One concern with this proposed solution is that changing the statutorily 
designated recipient from the VCGCB to the GCOs within each state
department would still result in noncompliance.  The proposed statute is 
clear when it designates the GCO as the proper recipient for government
claims against the state.  However, the current statute, designating the VCGCB,
is just as clear. Although this is a logical argument, the elimination of all
noncompliance is unrealistic.  There will inevitably be those claimants or 
attorneys that fail to read the language of the claim presentation statutes 
carefully.  But this statutory change would limit one of, if not the most, common
error: presentation to the wrong entity. 
The most obvious benefit of this statutory amendment, as alluded to
throughout this Comment, is the restoration of victims’ rights. With this
amendment, potential plaintiffs will no longer be left in the dark about their
misdirected claim.  They will no longer be punished for a mere procedural 
misstep, even though they have satisfied the legislative intent of giving notice 
to the state entity.  And they will no longer be deprived of their day in court 
as a result thereof. 
Noncompliance with the claims presentation statutes may be expected
more from a pro se plaintiff, but plaintiffs’ attorneys, perhaps those that are 
unfamiliar with the Act, also make mistakes when it comes to abiding by
the stringent claim presentation requirements currently in place under the
Act.218  When these attorneys fail to comply with the requirements and 
present their clients’ claims to the wrong entity, their clients may sue them
for legal malpractice if their claim gets dismissed.219  It is understandable 
that plaintiffs and plaintiffs’ attorneys would mistakenly believe that their 
claims should be presented to the public entity directly because, after all,
the public entity or its employees are the ones who allegedly caused the 
acts or omissions that gave rise to the suit.220  If the proposed statutory
amendment is adopted, clients will not need to sue their attorneys for 
217. This proposed statutory language is modeled after the current section 915,
subdivision (b), of the California Government Code.  The only change in the proposed language 
is the designated recipient of the claim. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 915(b) (West 2012). 
218. See Lopez v. California Dep’t of Ins., No. B164686, 2003 WL 21696221, at *6 (Cal. 
Ct. App. July 22, 2003) (involving plaintiff who argued “she was entitled to relief because 
her counsel’s failure to file a claim with the Board constituted excusable mistake or neglect.”). 
219. See supra note 69. 
220. Perhaps this is why so many other states require that claimants present their claims
against the state directly to the public entity or the employee that caused the injury.  See supra
notes 194–96 and accompanying text. 
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presenting their claim to the logical party—the party that allegedly caused
the harm.
Courts are consistently concerned with judicial efficiency.221  This statutory 
amendment would benefit not only plaintiffs and plaintiffs’ attorneys, but 
would also benefit the court system in general.  The change will prevent the 
filing of motions such as late claim motions or motions to be relieved from 
the government claim requirements, thereby increasing judicial efficiency.222 
Currently, plaintiffs’ suits against the state create empty costs for the court 
system.223  Cases are dismissed at the summary judgment stage because of 
noncompliance with the claims presentation requirement, which causes 
courts to invest time and expense in cases that will never go to trial because
of a mere procedural technicality.224 
As mentioned, one of the main purposes of the claims presentation
requirements is to allow for early resolution of cases.225  Not only will this 
statutory amendment help fulfill that purpose, but it may actually expedite 
it. Currently, the VCGCB has forty-five days to act upon the presented
claim.226  If claimants must present their claims against the state to the public
entity directly, then the public entity is made aware of the claim immediately 
and can begin settlement discussions earlier.  Because the VCGCB’s 
processing period would be eliminated, the entity would receive notice of 
the suit up to forty-five days earlier.  This would also result in more money
in plaintiffs’ pockets because less money would be expended in attorneys’
fees and costs.227  A plaintiff will receive more money if the state entity
 221. See, e.g., In re MacIntyre, 181 B.R. 420, 422 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995) (recognizing 
the importance of page limits for judicial efficiency and imposing sanctions on appellants 
for failing to comply with said limits), aff’d, 77 F.3d 489 (9th Cir. 1996), aff’d, 79 F.3d 1153 
(9th Cir. 1996). 
222. See supra Part II.D.
223. This is a reality because suits get dismissed at the summary judgment phase. 
See, e.g., DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa Clara, 289 P.3d 884 (Cal. 2012) (granting
defendant’s motion for summary judgment based on deficient notice of claim). 
224. See id.
 225. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
226. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
227. Early resolution of claims is very attractive for all parties involved.  The court system
recognizes the many benefits of resolving a case at the earliest stage possible.  Courts offer 
many processes to help people resolve disputes without going to trial. Alternative Dispute
Resolution (ADR), CAL. COURTS, http://www.courts.ca.gov/programs-adr.htm [https://perma.cc/ 
5LS7-JHR2] (last visited Aug. 1, 2016).  Such processes include “mediation, settlement 
conferences, neutral evaluation, and arbitration.”  ADR Types & Benefits, CAL. COURTS, 
http://www.courts.ca.gov/3074.htm [https://perma.cc/9E66-9TQ4] (last visited Aug. 1, 2016). 
The American Bar Association also encourages earlier resolution. “In 2011, the American 
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spends $50,000 during pre-litigation settlement proceedings rather than if 
the plaintiff wins $50,000 after litigation.  The latter is reduced by attorney’s 
fees and costs that the plaintiff must pay to their attorney, while the former
places more money in the victim’s pocket because the plaintiff’s attorney
will not have expended as much time at the settlement phase.228 
The public entity also benefits from earlier resolution because the amount 
of attorneys’ fees and costs increase exponentially for the entity as a case 
moves forward in the litigation process.229 Trying to settle cases later can 
therefore be much costlier for the public entity.  A case valued at $50,000 
rapidly becomes $100,000, if not more, once attorney’s fees and costs are 
factored in as a case proceeds.230 
Additionally, by permitting plaintiffs to submit their claims directly to the
public entity, the entity receives notice of unsafe conditions or improper 
practices and can thus resolve such dangers earlier.  The public entity can 
address these conditions or practices and limit or eliminate future harm.231 
This has obvious benefits for public safety in general, but also benefits the 
entity  because it may avoid future claims that would otherwise arise from
that same harm or improper condition, which ultimately results in the entity
saving money.232 
VII. CONCLUSION
Potential plaintiffs, like Ms. Brookes, should not be deprived of their 
day in court if they provide notice to the public entity, even if they fail to 
Bar Association Section of Dispute Resolution appointed the Planned Early Dispute Resolution 
Task Force to promote planned early dispute resolution by lawyers and clients.”  John Lande et
al., User Guide: Planned Early Dispute Resolution, AM. BAR ASS’N 1, http://www.american 
bar.org/content/dam/aba/events/dispute_resolution/committees/PEDR/abadr_pedr_guide.auth
checkdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/T32B-WR3X] (last visited Aug. 1, 2016). This task force
was created “to satisfy parties’ interests, reduce litigation risks, and save time and money.” 
Id.
 228. See Court Statistics Project, supra note 214, at 5–7 (estimating the cost of civil 
litigation in automobile torts cases and providing attorneys’ fees for each phase of litigation). 
229. This is why one of the goals of the claim presentation requirements is to give 
notice to the public entity so that it can begin investigations and settle without the cost of 
litigation. See supra note 13, 75, 76 and accompanying text. 
230. See Court Statistics Project, supra note 214, at 6 (estimating the amount of hours an
attorney expends at each phase of litigation and showing that the hours spent, and therefore
the attorney’s fees, increase exponentially as a case moves from settlement to pretrial to trial to
post-trial).
231. See supra notes 78–79 and accompanying text. 
232. See Baines Pickwick Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 74, 77 (Ct. 
App. 1999) (citing Phillips v. Desert Hosp. Dist., 780 P.2d 349, 356 (Cal. 1989)); Loehr 
v. Ventura Cty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 195 Cal. Rptr. 576, 581 (Ct. App. 1983) (“The purpose 
of the claims presentation requirement is . . . to enable the public entity to engage in fiscal 
planning for potential liabilities and to avoid similar liabilities in the future.”).
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file their claim with the VCGCB.  The ideas of notice to parties in a lawsuit 
and of upholding legislative intent are notions that thrive in civil procedure. 
Far too often, however, potential plaintiffs in California are deprived of
their day in court with respect to claims against the state.  There is a clear
need to change the current claims presentation requirement under section
915, subdivision (b).233  Due to a procedural technicality that is inconsistent
with the statute’s legislative intent, plaintiffs’ legitimate claims are becoming 
barred. Possible solutions include adding a substantial compliance clause
to section 915, subdivision (b), or adding a clause that would specifically 
require public entities to forward misdirected claims to the VCGCB upon 
erroneous receipt.234  The best solution, however, is to create individualized 
claims offices—GCOs—within each state entity, and to amend section 915, 
subdivision (b) to require potential plaintiffs to present their claims to the 
GCO within the state entity that allegedly caused the harm.235  This proposed
solution would recalibrate the scales of justice when it comes to filing a
government claim against the state by protecting plaintiffs’ rights, while still 
respecting the statute’s legislative intent of notice.236
 233. See supra Part III. 
234. See supra Parts VI.A, VI.B.
 235. See supra Part VI.C. 
236. In July 2016, shortly after this Comment was selected for publication, section
915, subdivision (b) was amended.  The statute now requires that claims against the state 
first be presented to the California Department of General Services (DGS), instead of the 
VCGCB. Government Claims Program, CAL. DEP’T OF GEN. SERVS., http://www.dgs.ca.gov/
orim/Programs/GovernmentClaims.aspx [https://perma.cc/TUV3-56LT] (last visited Aug. 
1, 2016); see also CAL. GOV’T CODE § 915(b). However, this statutory amendment does 
not affect this Comment’s analysis.  The same issues and concerns outlined above remain 
relevant because this amendment simply designates a new “middleman” to process claims
against the state. Now, instead of the VCGCB processing these claims, a different third party 
agency, the DGS does so. However, noncompliance with the statute is likely to remain since
claimants will continue to present their claims to the allegedly responsible public entity, instead 
of the “middleman” agency, whether that “middleman” is the VCGCB or the DGS. Accordingly,
this amendment has no affect on this Comment’s proposed solutions. The superior solution, 
even with this amendment, still involves (1) amending the current statute to require that
claimants present their claims against the state directly to the state agency that allegedly
caused the harm, instead of the DGS, thereby accomplishing the statute’s legislative intent of
proving notice to the allegedly responsible state agency, and (2) creating GCOs and having
these GCOs within each state agency process the claims against that respective agency,
instead of the DGS processing all claims against the state.
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